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I. INTRODUCTION

The body of international law that governs the rights of individuals,
rather than states, began its development at the end of the Second World
War. Until that time, international law dealt exclusively with relationships
between nations and left each nation's treatment of its citizens to that
nation's government. However, at the end of the Second World War, the
punishment of war criminals at Nuremberg and Tokyo and the desire to
prevent the recurrence of such crimes against humanity drastically changed
the status of individuals under international law.2 For the first time,
individuals gained important rights under international law and, to some
extent, the means for vindication of those rights on the international plane.3
Beginning in 1945 with the U.N. Charter,4 nations themselves began to
develop international human rights law by concluding multilateral treaties.
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, a U.N. General Assembly
resolution, came shortly thereafter.5 To date, there are seven major
1. See generally Louis B. Sohn, The New InternationalLaw: Protection of the Rights of
IndividualsRather than States, 32 Am. U.L. REV. 1 (1982).
2. Id. at 9-10.
3. Id. at 11.
4. U.N. CHARTER, available at http://wwwl .umn.edu/humanrts/instree/aunchart.htm (last
visited Mar. 28, 2005); see infra text accompanying notes 207-18.
5. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A(III), U.N. Doc. A/811 (1948)
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multilateral human rights treaties: the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights; 6 the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and
Cultural Rights;7 the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide;8 the International Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Racial Discrimination;9 the Convention on the Elimination
ofAll Forms of Discrimination Against Women;" the Convention Against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment;" l and the Convention on the Rights of the Child."
The United States played a major role in developing the international
human rights system and the treaties that comprise it.' 3 However, the
United States has ratified only four of the major human rights treaties, and

[hereinafter UDHR], availableat http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/b 1udhr.htm (last visited
Mar. 28, 2005); see infra text accompanying notes 225-43.
6. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, openedforsignatureDec. 16, 1966,
SEN. TREATY DOc. NO. 95-2, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (enteredintoforce March 23, 1976; ratified by the
United States June 8, 1992) [hereinafter ICCPR], availableat http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/
instree/b3ccpr.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2005); see infra text accompanying notes 244-65.
7. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, openedfor signature
Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered intoforce Jan. 3, 1976; signed by the United States Oct.
5, 1977, but not yet ratified) [hereinafter ICESCR], availableat http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/
instree/b2esc.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2005); see infra text accompanying notes 266-80.
8. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, openedfor
signatureDec. 9, 1948, SEN. TREATY Doc. NO. 81-1, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (enteredinto force Jan. 12,
1951; ratified by the United States Nov. 25, 1988) [hereinafter Genocide Convention], available
at http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/xlcppcg.htm (last visited Mar. 28,2005); see infra text
accompanying notes 281-89.
9. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,
openedfor signatureMar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (entered intoforce Jan. 4, 1969; ratified by
the United States Oct. 21, 1994) [hereinafter CERD], availableathttp://www l.umn.edu/humanrts/
instree/d l cerd.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2005); see infra text accompanying notes 290-96.
10. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, opened
for signature Mar. 1, 1980, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1981; signed by the
United States July 17, 1980, but not yet ratified) [hereinafter CEDAW], available at
http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/elcedaw.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2005); see infra text
accompanying notes 297-305.
11. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, openedfor signatureDec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (entered intoforce June 26,
1987; ratified by the United States Oct. 21, 1994) [hereinafter CAT], available at http://wwwl.
umn.edu/humanrts/instree/h2catoc.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2005); see infra text accompanying
notes 306-15.
12. Convention on the Rights of the Child, openedfor signature Nov. 20, 1989, 1577
U.N.T.S. 3 (enteredintoforce Sept. 2, 1990; signed bythe United States Feb. 16, 1995, but not yet
ratified) [hereinafter CRC], available at http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/k2crc.htm (last
visited Aug. 4, 2005); see infra text accompanying notes 316-30.
13. See infra text accompanying note 424.
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only did so after considerable delay. 4 Moreover, the United States has
declared the treaties it has ratified to have no legal effect as domestic law. 5
Other nations have widely criticized the United States for its failure to
ratify international human rights treaties and for its ineffective enforcement
of the few treaties it has ratified. 6
This Note recognizes that there are important foreign policy reasons for
ratifying human rights treaties, and argues that the practice of declaring
those treaties to have no domestic legal effect dramatically undercuts the
reasons for their ratification. Part H discusses the important constitutional
principles that underlie U.S. treaty law and policy. 7 Part I1 explores the
history of multilateral human rights treaties in the United States, including
the constitutional, political, and policy considerations that influence the
U.S. attitudes toward human rights treaties.' 8 Part I also examines the
proposed Bricker Amendment, a 1953 attempt to curtail U.S. participation
in international human rights agreements.' 9 Finally, Part III details the
current U.S. practice of occasionally ratifying human rights treaties but
attaching reservations, understandings, and declarations that rob these
treaties of any real domestic effect.2" Part IV discusses the substance of the
major multilateral human rights treaties and their status in the United
States. 2' Part V critically analyzes the practice of declaring human rights
treaties to have no domestic legal effect, and explores arguments for and
against the practice.22 Part V also examines the international implications
of that practice, most fundamentally, the promotion of an international
human rights double standard.23 In Part VI, the Note concludes with the
assertion that U.S. ratification practices do more harm than good to the
international human rights regime, and suggests that the United States
should not ratify'any more human rights treaties until it is prepared to make
real commitments to the terms of those treaties.24

14. See infra text accompanying notes 244-45,266-68, 282-83,291-92,299-99, 307-08, &
317-18.
15. See infra text accompanying notes 246, 284, 193, & 309.
16. See Natasha Fain, Human Rights Within the UnitedStates: The Erosion of Confidence,
21 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 607 (2003); see infratext accompanying notes 418-24.
17. See infra text accompanying notes 30-65.
18. See infra text accompanying notes 69-95.
19. See infra text accompanying notes 96-124.
20. See infra text accompanying notes 125-202.
21. See infra text accompanying notes 203-329.
22. See infra text accompanying notes 335-445.
23. See infra text accompanying notes 418-26.
24. See infra text accompanying notes 448-56.
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II. U.S. TREATY LAW AND ITS CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS

Several important constitutional principles underlie U.S. treaty law and
policy. Section A examines the principle that the President and the Senate
share the exclusive power to make treaties, to the exclusion of the House
of Representatives.25 Section B discusses the effect of treaties as domestic
law - that they are the law of the land and are of the same normative rank
as federal statutes, but only when they are "self-executing."26 Section C
examines the possible limits of the scope of the treaty power, defined
either by the Constitution itself or by general principles of federalism.27
These last two points play a major role in determining the willingness of
the Senate to approve the ratification of human rights treaties,28 while the
first greatly undermines the Senate's asserted right to declare a treaty
nonself-executing 9
A. The Treaty-Making Power and Process
Article II of the U.S. Constitution provides that the President "shall
have the Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to
make Treaties., 3' This allocation of the treaty power is unique: treaty25. See infra text accompanying notes 30-38.
26. See infra text accompanying notes 39-57.
27. See infra text accompanying notes 58-65.
28. THOMAS BUERGENTHAL, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN A NUTSHELL 278 (2d ed.
1995); see infra text accompanying notes 77-86.
29. See infra text accompanying notes 384-401.
30. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW
OF THE UNITED STATES § 303(1) (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD)]; LOUIS HENKIN,
FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 130 (1972). The power to make treaties is vested

primarily in the President, but is limited by the requirement that two-thirds of the senators concur
with hisjudgment. See Timothy K. Kuhner, Note, Human Rights Treatiesin US.Law: The Status
Quo, Its Underlying Bases, and Pathwaysfor Change, 13 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 419, 423
(2003). The first draft ofthe U.S. Constitution gave the Senate sole treaty-making power, but James
Madison argued that the President should be involved because the Senate represents only the states,
not the federal government. See Kevin C. Kennedy, ConditionalApproval of Treaties by the U.S.
Senate, 19 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMe. L. REV. 89, 92 (1996) (citing CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH
SERVICE, 98TH CONG., TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS: THE ROLE OF THE

UNITED STATES SENATE 26-27 (Comm. Print 1984)). The Framers approved the President's role
in the process after much debate, but subjected it to the advice and consent of the Senate. See id.
at 93. For more extensive analyses of the development and historical meaning of the "advice and
consent" requirement, see DENNA FRANK FLEMING, THE TREATY VETO OF THE AMERICAN SENATE

3-15 (1930) (citing THE FEDERALISTNOS. 64 (John Jay), 74, 75 (Alexander Hamilton)); HENKIN,
supra, at 129; FELIX MORLEY, TREATY LAW AND THE CONSTrTUTION: A STUDY OF THE BRICKER
AMENDMENT 14-17 (1953) (citing THE FEDERALIST Nos. 44 (James Madison), 64 (John Jay), 75
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making is the only area in which unicameral lawmaking, which excludes
the participation of the House of Representatives, is required. 31 The
accepted practice is that the President initiates and conducts the negotiation
of treaties, and later brings a signed or otherwise final draft to the Senate
for its "advice and consent., 32 The Senate Foreign Relations Committee
then holds hearings on the treaty, during which it receives testimony,
prepares a report on the treaty, and votes whether or not to recommend a
resolution of ratification to the full Senate.33 The Committee's
recommendation may contain proposed reservations, understandings, or

(Alexander Hamilton)); Arthur Bestor, "Advice "from the Very Beginning, "Consent" When the
End is Achieved, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 718 (1989); Arthur Bestor, The Respective Roles of the Senate
andPresident in the Making andAbrogationof Treaties: The OriginalIntent of the Framersof the
Constitution Historically Examined, 55 WASH. L. REV. 4 (1979). A "treaty" is defined by
international law as any written agreement between states, so long as it is governed by international
law. Vienna Convention on the Law ofTreaties, openedforsignatureMay 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331, art. 2 (enteredintoforce Jan. 27, 1980; signed by the United States Apr. 24, 1970, but not yet
ratified) [hereinafter Vienna Convention]; BARRY E. CARTER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW 94 (4th
ed. 2003); see Anne M. Williams, United States Treaty Law, in U.S. RATIFICATION OF THE
INTERNATIONAL COVENANTS ON HuMAN RIGHTS 35-36 (Hurst Hannum & Dana D. Fischer eds.,
1993); Stefan A. Riesenfeld & Frederick M. Abbott, The Scope of U.S. Senate Control over the
Conclusion and Operationof Treaties, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 571, 574 (1991). But "treaties" in
U.S. law include only those agreements that are concluded by the President with the advice and
consent of two-thirds of the Senate. CARTER ET AL., supra, at 94; see Williams, supra, at 36. The
President may conclude other international agreements, called executive agreements, with or
without the support of Congress. See CARTER ET AL., supra, at 94; HENKIN, supra, at 173-87;
MORLEY, supra, at 17-21; Riesenfeld & Abbott, supra, at 635. The President's authority to make
executive agreements derives from the general executive authority. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1; the
Commander-in-Chief power, U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1; the authority to receive Ambassadors;
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3; and the obligation to "take care that the laws be faithfully executed," U.S.
CONST. art. II, § 3. See also Riesenfeld & Abbott, supra, at 635. Executive agreements are not
treaties for the purpose of domestic law, although they are considered treaties under international
law. CARTER ET AL., supra, at 94.
31 - Spe I.N.S_ v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 954 (1983); HENKIN, supra note 30. at 130;
Riesenfeld & Abbott, supra note 30, at 578. It appears that the Framers of the U.S. Constitution
decided to exclude the House of Representatives from the treaty power on the ground that such a
large body would not be conducive to the "secrecy and dispatch" required. Riesenfeld & Abbott,
supranote 30, at 578 (citing S. REP. No. 98-205 (1984)); SAMUELB. CRANDALL, TREATIES, THEIR
MAKING AND ENFORCEMENT (2d ed. 1916)).
32. See HENKIN, supra note 30, at 131-32; Williams, supra note 30, at 39-40; Curtis A.
Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Treaties, Human Rights, and ConditionalConsent, 149 U. PA. L.
REV. 399, 404 (2000); Riesenfeld & Abbott, supra note 30, at 579 ("Only once did a President
(Washington) personally visit the Senate for negotiating advice, with notoriously poor results.");
see also FLEMING, supra note 30, at 21-26.
33. Williams, supra note 30, at 40-41; Riesenfeld & Abbott, supra note 30, at 580-81.
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declarations.34 The full Senate then considers the treaty and votes on the
resolution of ratification." This vote is the only one that requires a twothirds majority; all other votes are by simple majority.3 6 If the treaty
receives the required vote, the Senate sends the resolution to the
President.37 Upon the President's
ratification, the treaty becomes binding
38
upon the United States.
34. HENKIN, supra note 30, at 133-36; Williams, supra note 30, at 41-43; Riesenfeld &
Abbott, supra note 30, at 581. There is no constitutional basis for the Senate's asserted right to
amend treaties, although the Senate's authority to impose amendments is not seriously questioned.
HENKIN, supra note 30, at 133-34; Kennedy, supra note 30, at 97.
Ifthe Senate can give or withhold consent it can also give its consent on condition
that changes be made. Or, one might say, the Senate withholds consent from the
treaty presented to it but indicates what revised treaty will earn its consent, and
gives [its consent] in advance to a treaty as so revised.
supra note 30, at 133. The asserted right to amend may have developed as a way for the
Senate to share in negotiations. FLEMING, supra note 30, at 33.

HENKIN,

The practical difficulty of its complete isolation under the constitution from any
contact with foreign powers made it impossible for the Senate to establish a right
to take part directly in the negotiation of treaties. The makers of the Constitution,
as we have seen, undoubtedly intended that the Senate should act as a council to
the President in framing proposed treaties, but after that experiment proved a
failure the Senate found no feasible method of sharing in the negotiations. The
President had in his hands the explicit power "to make treaties" and the Senate
found no new way of making the limiting clause "by and with the advice and
consent of the Senate" mean anything in advance of the time when the remainder
of the limitation, "provided two thirds of the Senators present concur", became
effective.
The Senators assumed from the very beginning, however, that a treaty was not
made until two thirds of them had formally approved it and that any changes they
saw fit to make in the negotiated document were in order. [FN: For the purpose
of amending a treaty the requirement of a bare majority only of the Senators
present was adopted.] Amending is a legislative habit and it would be natural for
any Senator to assume that if a provision of the treaty did not suit him the thing to
do was to propose an amendment.
Id. For more on the historical development and use of the Senate's asserted right to propose
amendments to treaties, see generally id. at 33-49.
35. Riesenfeld & Abbott, supra note 30, at 581.
36. Williams, supra note 30, at 40; Riesenfeld & Abbott, supra note 30, at 581.
37. See Williams, supra note 30, at 41; Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 32, at 404;
Riesenfeld & Abbott, supra note 30, at 581.
38. HENKIN, supra note 30, at 130; Williams, supra note 30, at 43; Bradley & Goldsmith,
supranote 32, at 404; Riesenfeld & Abbott, supranote 30, at 581. The President has the discretion
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B. The Effect of Treaties as Domestic Law
1. The Supremacy Clause: Treaties as the Law of the Land
Article VI of the U.S. Constitution (the Supremacy Clause) states, "all
Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United
States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State
shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State
to the Contrary notwithstanding." 3 9 Treaties properly concluded are thus
part of U.S. federal law--cases arising under treaties may be heard by the
federal courts, and the U.S. Supreme Court is therefore the authoritative
interpreter of treaties.' Moreover, as federal law, treaties supersede all
conflicting state law.4
Although the U.S. Constitution does not specify the relationship
between treaties and federal statutes, 42 most courts and commentators
interpret the Supremacy Clause to mean that the two have the same
normative rank under the U.S. Constitution.43 Thus, in the case of 44a
conflict between a federal statute and a self-executing treaty provision,
the later in time prevails as far as the domestic law of the United States is
concerned; this is known as the "last-in-time" rule.45 Therefore, the
President and the Senate may override federal statutes and federal case law
by treaty. This rule also applies to legislation implementing a nonselfexecuting treaty, since the conflict in that situation essentially is between
L
two federal statutes.'

at this point to ratify or not ratify the treaty. Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 32, at 404.
Ratification is the act by which a nation formally declares its intent to be bound by a treaty. Id.
39. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
40. See U.S. CONST. art. III. §§ 1.2: RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 11 1(2)(1987); Kuhner.suprn
note 30, at 423.
41. But see infra text accompanying notes 47-57.
42. Williams, supranote 30, at 44.
43. See Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888); BUERGENTHAL, supra note 28, at
278; HENKIN, supranote 30, at 163-64; Williams, supranote 30, at 44; Thomas Buergenthal, The
US. and InternationalHuman Rights, 9 HuM. RTs. L.J. 141, 143 (1988).
44. See infra notes 47-57 and accompanying text.
45. See Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371,376 (1998); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 18 (1957);
Whitney, 124 U.S. at 194; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 115; BUERGENTHAL, supra note 28, at 278;
CARTER ET AL., supranote 30, at 185; HENKIN, supranote 30, at 163-64; Williams, supra note 30,
at 44; Buergenthal, supranote 43, at 143.
46. See infra text accompanying notes 47-57.
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2. Self-Executing vs. Nonself-Executing Treaties
The Supremacy Clause makes clear that treaties override inconsistent
state law and is construed to mean that treaties also override earlier federal
statutes.47 However, the courts have created a distinction between "selfexecuting" and "non-self-executing" treaties, consistently holding that only
self-executing treaties constitute judicially enforceable federal law upon
ratification.48 Nonself-executing treaties, on the other hand, do not
47. See Curtis A. Bradley, InternationalDelegations,The StructuralConstitution,andNonSelf-Execution, 55 STAN. L. REv. 1557, 1587 (2003); supra text accompanying notes 42-46.
48. A self-executing treaty is one for which no domestic legislation is required to give it the
force of federal law in the United States. See, e.g., Trans World Airlines v. Franklin Mint Corp.,
466 U.S. 243,252 (1984); Carlos Manuel Vazquez, TheFourDoctrinesofSelf-Executing Treaties,
89 AM. J. INT'LL. 695,695 (1995) [hereinafter Vazquez, The FourDoctrines] ("At a general level,
a self-executing treaty may be defined as a treaty that may be enforced in the courts without prior
legislation by Congress, and a non-self-executing treaty, conversely, is a treaty that may not be
enforced in the courts without prior legislative 'implementation."'); Kuhner, supra note 30, at 427.
Most commentators trace the distinction between self-executing and nonself-executing treaties to
Chief Justice Marshall's majority opinion in Foster v. Neilson:
A treaty is in its nature a contract between two nations, not a legislative act. It
does not generally effect, of itself, the object to be accomplished, especially so far
as its operation is infra-territorial; but is carried into execution by the sovereign
power of the respective parties to the instrument.
In the United States a different principle is established. Our constitution declares
a treaty to be the law of the land. It is, consequently, to be regarded in courts of
justice as equivalent to an act of the legislature, whenever it operates of itself
without the aid of any legislative provision. But when the terms of the stipulation
import a contract, when either of the parties engages to perform a particular act,
the treaty addresses itself to the political, not the judicial department; and the
legislature must execute the contract before it can become a rule for the Court.
Fosterv. Neilson, 27 U.S. (1 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829). The "self-executing" terminologywas first used
by the Court in Whitney v. Robertson:
A treaty is primarily a contract between two or more independent nations ....
When the stipulations are not self-executing, they can only be enforced pursuant
to legislation to carry them into effect .... If the treaty contains stipulations which
are self-executing, that is, require no legislation to make them operative, to that
extent they have the force and effect of a legislative enactment.
Whitney, 124 U.S. at 194; see also Marjorie Cohn, Affirmative Action and the Equality Principle
in HumanRights Treaties: UnitedStates' Violation ofits InternationalObligations,43 VA. J. INT'L
L. 249, 260 (2002) ("The Supremacy Clause does not contain the requirement that treaties be 'selfexecuting' in order to bind the United States."); Lori Fisler Damrosch, The Role of the United
States Senate Concerning "Self-Executing "and "Non-Self-Executing" Treaties, 67 CHi.-KENT L.
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themselves create judicially enforceable federal law; rather, Congress must
pass legislation implementing their terms.4 9
REV. 515, 516 (1991) ("Article VI of the Constitution does not use these categories or suggest that
these distinctions can be made. The concept is essentially a judicial one, created by the courts to
govern their own role with respect to treaties."); Jordan J. Paust, Self-Executing Treaties, 82 AM.
J. INT'L L. 760, 760 (1988) ("The distinction found in certain cases between 'self-executing' and
'non-self-executing' treaties is a judicially invented notion that is patently inconsistent with the
express language in the Constitution affirming that 'all Treaties ...shall be the supreme Law of
the Land.") (quoting U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2) (emphasis added). On the original intent of the
Supremacy Clause, see Paust, supra,at 760-64; Vazquez, The FourDoctrines,supra,at 697-700.
See, e.g., Asakura v. Seattle, 265 U.S. 332, 341 (1924); Poindexter v. Nash, 333 F.3d 372,379 (2d
Cir. 2003); Hain v. Gibson, 287 F.3d 1224, 1243 (10th Cir. 2002); Beazley v. Johnson, 242 F.2d
248, 267 (5th Cir. 2001); Igartua De la Rosa v. United States, 32 F.3d 8, 10 n.1 (1st Cir. 1994);
United States v. Postal, 589 F.2d 862, 875-76 (5th Cir. 1979); In re Atuar, No. 503-MC-0 104, 2003
WL 23207823, at *11 (S.D.W. Va. 2003); Sei Fujii v. California, 242 P.2d 617, 619-20 (Cal.
1952); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 111(3) ("Courts in the United States are bound to give effect to
international law and to international agreements of the United States, except that a 'non-selfexecuting' agreement will not be given effect as law in the absence of necessary implementation.");
CARTER ET AL., supra note 30, at 168-76; HENKIN, supra note 30, at 156-67; Williams, supranote
30, at 47-49; Bradley, supranote 47, at 1587; Cohn, supra,at 260-61; Damrosch, supra,at 515-18;
Riesenfeld &Abbott, supranote 30, at 574-75; Johan D. van der Vyver, American Exceptionalism:
Human Rights, InternationalCriminalJustice, and National Self-Righteousness, 50 EMORY L.J.
775,788 (2001); Carlos Manuel Vazquez, Laughing at Treaties,99COLuM.L.REv. 2154,2175-76
(1999) [hereinafter Vazquez, Laughing at Treaties];Vazquez, The FourDoctrines,supra,at 695700; David Weissbrodt, United States Ratificationof the Human Rights Covenants, 63 MINN. L.
REv. 35, 66-67 (1978); Kuhner, supra note 30, at 428-29.
49. See supra note 48 and sources cited therein. A nation's failure to promptly implement a
nonself-executing treaty may result in default under its international treaty obligations.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 111, Reporter's Note 5; Riesenfeld & Abbott, supra note 30, at 575;

Kuhner, supra note 30, at 428-29. Nonself-execution does not change the international law
obligations imposed by a treaty, but simply means that U.S. courts will not directly enforce U.S.
compliance with the treaty. Bradley, supra note 47, at 1589. There is an ongoing debate between
at least four theories of the definition and implication of "non-self-execution." The first is a "cause
of action".theory, proponents of which reason that a nonself-executing treaty does not create a
private cause of action, but does allow plaintiffs or defendants to indirectly invoke substantive
treaty provisions. See David Sloss, The Domesticationof InternationalHuman Rights: Non-SelfExecuting Declarations and Human Rights Treaties, 24 YALE J. INT'L L. 129, 151-52 (1999)
[hereinafter Sloss, The Domestication of InternationalHuman Rights]; Vazquez, Laughing at
Treaties, supra note 48, at 2182-83; Chrissy Fox, Comment, Implications of the United States'
ReservationsandNon-Self-ExecutingDeclarationto the ICCPRforCapitalOffenders andForeign
Relations, 11 TUL. J. INT'L& CoMP. L. 303, 308-09 (2003). The second is a "no standing" theory
(the Carter doctrine), under which an individual lacks standing to invoke the treaty as the basis for
a cause of action, whether procedurally or substantively; under this theory, courts are not authorized
to provide judicial remedies for treaty violations because the treaty makers intended to preclude
judicial remedies for violations. See David Sloss, Non-Self-Executing Treaties: Exposing a
ConstitutionalFallacy,36 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1, 14 (2002) [hereinafter Sloss, Non-Self-Executing
Treaties]; Sloss, The Domestication ofInternationalHuman Rights, supra, at 149-51; Vazquez,
Laughing at Treaties,supranote 48, at 2178-80; Vazquez, The FourDoctrines,supra note 48, at
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The question whether a treaty is self-executing has been called one of
the "most confounding" in treaty law." Whether or not a treaty is selfexecuting is initially a question for the President, but is ultimately an issue
for the courts, which must determine whether to give the treaty effect as
law in the absence of implementing legislation." There is some debate
about whether courts should presume that treaties are self-executing or
nonself-executing; however, the trend in recent years supports a
presumption against self-execution, especially for multilateral treaties. 2
A treaty generally will be deemed self-executing if it is intended by the
parties to create domestically enforceable rights and if its provisions are
sufficiently precise to be legally executed; only if the treaty is ambiguous
may the court look to the circumstances surrounding the negotiations. 3 A
719-22; Fox, supra, at 309. Proponents of the third theory (the Foster doctrine) argue that a
nonself-executing treaty, while primary domestic law upon ratification, is not enforceable in the
United States, and deny a plaintiff or defendant any right to rely on the treaty in any capacity. Under
this theory, courts are not authorized to provide judicial remedies for treaty violations because the
provision at issue is addressed to the legislature, and is not the type of law that the judiciary is
competent to enforce. See Foster,27 U.S. at 314; Sloss, Non-Self-Executing Treaties, supra,at 13;
Sloss, The DomesticationoflnternationalHuman Rights, supra,at 147-49; Vazquez, Laughing at
Treaties, supranote 48, at 2181-82; Vazquez, The FourDoctrines,supranote 48, at 700-10; Fox,
supra, at 309. The fourth is the "lack of a privately enforceable right" theory (the Whitney doctrine),
which means that no enforceable treaty-based individual rights exist because the treaty has no
domestic status in the absence of implementing legislation; under this theory, the treaty provision
lacks the status of domestic law because it is outside the scope of the treaty-makers' domestic
lawmaking powers. See Whitney, 124 U.S. at 194; Sloss, Non-Self-Executing Treaties, supra,at 1314; Sloss, The DomesticationoflnternationalHumanRights,supra, at 146-47; Vazquez, Laughing
at Treaties, supra note 48, at 2177-78; Vazquez, The Four Doctrines, supra note 48, at 718-19;
Fox, supra, at 309-10. Even though nonself-executing treaties cannot operate directly without
implementing legislation, they may be used indirectly as a means of interpreting relevant
constitutional, statutory, common law, or other legal provisions. Paust, supra note 48, at 781.
50. Postal,589 F.2d at 876.
51. Id. ("The question whether a treaty is self-executing is a matter of interpretation for the
courts when the issue presents itself in litigation.
"); see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 154(1);
Weissbrodt, supra note 48, at 67.
52. Bradley, supra note 47, at 1588. But some scholars, relying on the Supremacy Clause,
argue that treaties are presumed self-executing, and therefore judicially enforceable, regardless of
subsequent implementing legislation. E.g., Fox, supranote 49, at 310.
53. But see RESTATEMENT(TmRD) § 111(4) (defining "non-self-executing" treaties, not selfexecuting treaties); Postal,589 F.2d at 876-78; SeiFujii,242 P.2d at 620 ("in determining whether
a treaty is self-executing courts look to... recourse may be had to the circumstances surrounding
its execution."); Williams, supranote 30, at 47-48; van der Vyver, supra note 48, at 788.
An international agreement of the United States is "non-self-executing"
(a) if the agreement manifests an intention that it shall not become effective as
domestic law without the enactment of implementing legislation,
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treaty may expressly provide for legislative execution;54 however, there is
some debate on whether the intent of the parties is an appropriate standard
for evaluating multilateral treaties.55 Also relevant in U.S. law is whether
the treaty makers have constitutional power to make domestic law on a
certain subject.56 Unless the language of the treaty expressly requires
legislative interpretation or the subject matter is within the exclusive

(b) if the Senate in giving consent to a treaty, or Congress by resolution, requires
implementing legislation, or
(c) if implementing legislation is constitutionally required.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 111(4).

In determining whether a treaty is self-executing courts look to the intent of the
signatory parties as manifested by the language of the instrument, and, if the
instrument is uncertain, recourse may be had to the circumstances surrounding its
execution.... In order for a treaty provision to be operate [sic] without the aid of
implementing legislation and to have the force and effect of a statute, it must
appear that the framers of the treaty intended to prescribe a rule that, standing
alone, would be enforceable in the courts.
Sei Fujii,242 P.2d at 620 (citations omitted). On the "intent thesis," which holds that the intent of
the treaty makers determines whether a treaty is self-executing or nonself-executing, see generally
Sloss, Non-Self-Executing Treaties,supra note 49, at 3-18.
54. Postal,589 F.2d at 876.
55. See Weissbrodt, supra note 48, at 69.
In regard to a multilateral treaty [... ] it is doubtful whether the intent of the
parties manifested either at drafting or in ratification should serve as the
appropriate standard of evaluation. The interest of only a few parties to a
multilateral treaty should not control its self-executing effect. Professor Riesenfeld
has suggested, instead, that a multilateral treaty ought to be deemed self-executing
if it "(a) involves the rights and duties of individuals; (b) does not cover a subject
for which legislative action is required by the Constitution; and (c) does not leave
discretion to the parties in the application of particular provision."
Id. (quoting Stefan A. Riesenfeld, The Doctrine of Self-Executing Treaties and GAIT: A Notable
German Judgment, 65 AM. J. INT'L L. 548, 550 (1971)) (all other citations omitted); see also
Williams, supra note 30, at 47-49.
56. See infra text accompanying notes 58-60; see also Postal,589 F.2d at 877 ("Treaties
cannot affect certain subject matters without implementing legislation."); RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
§ 141(3) ("A treaty cannot be self-executing ... to the extent that it involves governmental action
that under the Constitution can be taken only by the Congress."). Two commonly cited examples
are appropriation of money and imposition of criminal sanctions. See, e.g., The Over the Top, 5
F.2d 838, 845 (D. Conn. 1925).
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jurisdiction of the U.S. Congress, the question is 5purely
a matter of
7
interpretation, in which numerous factors play a role.
C. The Scope andLimits of the Treaty Power
1. Subject Matter Limitations
It was sometimes suggested that a treaty, to be valid under the U.S.
Constitution, must address matters of "international" or "external"
concern." Most courts and commentators today, however, reject the idea
of a subject matter limitation on the treaty power, and assert that the United
States may make an agreement on any subject matter that is properly the
subject of negotiations with a foreign country.5 9 However, a treaty
provision may not be given effect as U.S. domestic law if it conflicts with
the U.S. Constitution.6 °
57. Postal,589 F.2d at 877. The Fifth Circuit lists the following seven factors to consider in
carrying out the "interpretive task": the history of the treaty, the negotiations, the practical
construction adopted by the parties, the purposes of the treaty and the objectives of its creators, the
existence of domestic procedures and institutions appropriate for direct implementation, the
availability and feasibility of alternative enforcement methods, and the immediate and long-range
consequences of self-execution or nonself-execution. Id. (citing Choctaw Nation of Indians v.
United States, 318 U.S. 423, 431-32 (1943); People of Saipan v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 502 F.2d
90, 97 (9th Cir. 1974)).
58. CARTER ET AL., supra note 30, at 158; see Power Auth. of N.Y. v. Fed. Power Comm'n,
247 F.2d 538, 543 (D.C. Cir. 1957) (holding that the treaty power may not be used to regulate
,"matters which are of purely domestic concern and do not pertain to our relations with other
nations"); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
1 17(1)(a) (1965) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (SECOND)] (explaining that the constitutional power
to enter into international agreements extends only to matters of "international concern").
59. CARTER ET AL., supra note 30, at 158; see Williams, supra note 30, at 38-39; David
Golove, HumanRights Treaties and the U.S. Constitution,52 DEPAULL. REv. 579,621-22 (2002);
Louis Henkin, The Constitution, Treaties, andInternationalHuman Rights, 116 U. PA. L. REv.
1012, 1019-21 (1968); see also Santovincenzo v. Egan, 284 U.S. 30,40 (1931) ("The treaty making
power is broad enough to cover all subjects that properly pertain to our foreign relations."); Asakura
v. Seattle, 265 U.S. 332, 341 (1924) ("The treaty-making power... extend[s] to all proper subjects
of negotiation between our government and other nations."); Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 267
(1890) ("[I]t is not perceived that there is any limit to the questions which can be adjusted touching
any matter which is properly the subject of negotiation with a foreign country."); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) § 302, cmt. c ("Contrary to what was once suggested, the Constitution does not require that
an international agreement deal only with 'matters of international concern.'. . . The United States
may make an agreement on any subject suggested by its national interests in relations with other
nations."). See generally HENKIN, supra note 30, at 137-42.
60. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1957); RESTATEMENT(THIRD) § 302; BtERGENTHAL,
supra note 28, at 278; Williams, supra note 30, at 36-37; Henkin, supra note 59, at 1015-16; see
HENKIN, supra note 30, at 137 ("[T]reaties are subject to the constitutional limitations that apply
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2. Federalism Limitations
States have sometimes argued that treaties could not deal with matters
reserved to the states, as contemplated by the U.S. Constitution generally,
and the Tenth Amendment specifically.6" However, the U.S. Supreme
Court has definitively rejected those claims,62 and holds that treaties, as
federal law, supersede all state laws, and therefore may also federalize a
subject that may have previously been governed by state law.6 3 Because
to all exercises of federal power, principally the prohibitions of the Bill of Rights."). The Court in
Reid explained,
[N]o agreement with a foreign nation can confer power on the Congress, or on any
other branch of Government, which is free from the restraints of the
Constitution.... It would be manifestly contrary to the objectives of those who
created the Constitution, as well as those who were responsible for the Bill of
Rights - let alone alien to our entire constitutional history and tradition - to
construe Article VI as permitting the United States to exercise power under an
international agreement without observing constitutional prohibitions. In effect,
such construction would permit amendment of that document in a manner not
sanctioned by Article V. The prohibitions of the Constitution were designed to
apply to all branches of the National Government and they cannot be nullified by
the Executive or by the Executive and the Senate combined.
Reid, 354 U.S. at 16-17.
61. HENKIN, supra note 30, at 144; see Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 432 (1920) ("It
is said that a treaty cannot be valid if it infringes the Constitution, that there are limits, therefore,
to the treaty-making power, and that one such limit is that what an act of Congress could not do
unaided, in derogation of the powers reserved to the states, a treaty cannot do."); CHARLES WILBUR
ENGELLAND, THE BRICKER AMENDMENT 2-3 (1954).
62. Holland,252 U.S. at 433. Justice Holmes explained,
Acts of Congress are the supreme law of the land only when made in pursuance
of the Constitution, while treaties are declared to be so when made under the
authoritV of the United States.... It is obvious that there may be matters of the
sharpest exigency for the national well being that an act of Congress could not
deal with but that a treaty followed by such an act could.
Id.(emphasis added).
63. See Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372-73 (2000); Zschernig v.
Miller, 389 U.S. 429,440-41 (1968); United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203,230-34 (1942); Holland,
252 U.S. at 432-35; BUERGENTHAL, supranote 28, at 278; Williams, supra note 30, at 37; Golove,
supra note 59, at 586-87, 602-03.
[T]he treaty power is a separate and independent power delegated to the national
government and [is] not limited to those subjects falling within the scope of the
enumerated legislative powers granted to Congress. If a treaty advances the
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treaty-making is itself a delegated power, the scope of the treaty power is
not limited by Congress's delegated powers. 64 Therefore, the President and
the Senate may conclude a treaty on any matter that is properly the subject
of foreign relations, even if beyond Congress's delegated legislative
powers.65
I1. THE HISTORY OF MULTILATERAL HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES IN THE
UNITED STATES

The United States historically has had, at best, an uneasy relationship
with multilateral human rights treaties. Section A examines the

national interests of the United States, it is valid irrespective of whether Congress
under some other head of power, like the commerce power, otherwise has
legislative authority over the subject. Thus, treaties may properly touch on subjects
that, as a purely legislative matter, are reserved to the states.
Golove, supra note 59, at 586. As the Court explained in Crosby,
A fundamental principle of the Constitution is that Congress has the power to
preempt state law. Even without an express provision for preemption, we have
found that state law must yield to a congressional Act in at least two
circumstances. When Congress intends federal law to "occupy the field," state law
in that area is preempted. And even if Congress has not occupied the field, state
law is naturally preempted to the extent of any conflict with a federal statute. We
will find preemption where it is impossible for a private party to comply with both
state and federal law, and where "under the circumstances of [a] particular case,
[the challenged state law] stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and
execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress."
Crosby, 530 U.S. at 372-73 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 66-67 (1941); all other
citations and footnotes omitted). See generally HENKIN, supra note 30, at 144-46,227-48; Henkin,
supra note 59, at 1017-18.
64. Golove, supra note 59, at 590-91, 602-03; Henkin, supra note 59, at 1017-18.
The treaty power is a separate and additional delegation of subject matter authority
to the national government. Hence, it can properly touch on subjects appropriate
for treaty-making, even if those subjects do not fall within the subject matter scope
of the legislative powers delegated to Congress. The Tenth Amendment limits the
treaty power not by reference to Congress's enumerated legislative powers but by
reference to the nature and purposes of the treaty power itself.
Golove, supra note 59, at 590.
65. Golove, supra note 59, at 589-90, 602-03; Henkin, supra note 59, at 1017-18 (asserting
that treaties "are not limited by any 'invisible radiation' from the truism that is the tenth
amendment").
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constitutional, political, and policy arguments against unqualified
ratification of human rights treaties.' Section B discusses the Bricker
Amendment, an attempt to prevent the United States from ratifying any
human rights treaties, and its consequences.67 Section C presents an
examination of the current practice of occasional ratification subject to
reservations, declarations, and understandings.68
A. The U.S. Aversion to UnqualifiedRatification of Human
Rights Treaties
The uneasy U.S. relationship with multilateral human rights treaties
took root in the 1950S. 69 Although the United States played a prominent
role in creating the emerging international regime of human rights law,7"
there was much uncertainty and debate during that decade about whether
and to what extent the nation should participate in the regime.7" The
political groups that wanted to eliminate dejure racial discrimination soon
realized that the human rights treaties could be used to strike down
discriminatory laws that Congress was unwilling to repeal or nullify.72
Thus, Senate debates focused on the domestic implications of ratifying the
human rights treaties.73
Some Senators were concerned that ratification of the human rights
treaties would give the U.S. Congress power to enact civil rights legislation
beyond its constitutional powers.74 Others were concerned that the human

See infra text accompanying notes 69-95.
See infra text accompanying notes 96-124.
See infra text accompanying notes 125-202.
See generally CARTER ET AL., supra note 30 at 799.
See Hurst Hannum & Dana D. Fischer, The PoliticalFramework, in U.S. RATIFICATION
OF THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 30, at 12-14; LouiS HENKIN,
THE AGE OF RIGHTS 65, 74 (1990); DuANE TANANBAuM, THE BRICKER AMENDMENT
CONTROVERSY: A TEST OF EISENHOWER'S POLITICAL LEADERSHIP 16-20 (1988); Bradley &
Goldsmith, supra note 32, at 411.
71. See TANANBAUM, supra note 70, at i-3, 16-20; Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 32, at
411.
72. BUERGENTHAL, supra note 28, at 279-81; Buergenthal, supra note 43, at 144. The first
judicial suggestions that the U.N. Charter, as a ratified treaty of the United States, was federal law
that outlawed racial discrimination were the concurring opinions of Justices Black and Murphy.
Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948); see id. at 649-50 (Black, J., concurring); id. at 673
(Murphy, J., concurring). See generally TANANBAUM, supra note 70, at 4-7.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

73. See NATALIE HEVENER KAUFMAN, HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES AND THE SENATE: A
HISTORY OF OPPOSITION 95 (1990); Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 32, at 411.

74. See BUERGENTHAL, supra note 28, at 279-81; Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 32, at
411. This belief was somewhat plausible in light of Missouriv. Holland,252 U.S. 416 (1920), in
which the U.S. Supreme Court held that, when implementing a treaty, Congress is not subject to
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rights treaties would preempt state law, under the Supremacy Clause.75 All
of those opposed to U.S. adherence to human rights treaties set forth a
variety of constitutional, political, and policy-based arguments against
ratification.76
1. Constitutional Arguments
Opponents of U.S. adherence to human rights treaties advanced three
basic legal arguments. 7 First they argued that the U.S. Constitution does
not permit the use of the treaty-making power to regulate human rights
because it is not a proper subject for international negotiations.7 However,
it cannot be seriously contended today that human rights are not a proper
subject of foreign relations.79
the federalism limitations applicable to the exercise of its legislative powers. Id. at 433; see Bradley
& Goldsmith, supranote 32, at 411; supratext accompanying notes 62-65.
75. See BUERGENTHAL, supra note 28, at 279-81; Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 32, at
411; supratext accompanying notes 39-46. In Oyama, four U.S. Supreme Court justices endorsed
this argument. See Oyama, 332 U.S. at 649-50 (Black, J., concurring, joined by Douglas, J.); id.
at 673 (Murphy, J., concurring, joined by Rutledge, J.). See generally BUERGENTHAL, supra note
28, at 279-81; TANANBAUM, supra note 70, at 4-7.
76. See infra text accompanying notes 77-95. For a typology of the arguments against U.S.
ratification of the human rights treaties, see KAUFMAN, supra note 73, at 204-05. The following
sections will focus only on the major constitutional, political, and policy-based arguments.
77. See BUERGENTHAL, supra note 28, at 284-87.
78. Id. at 285; see ENGELLAND, supranote 61, at 31-40; Hurst Hannum & Dana D. Fischer,
Conclusion, in U.S. RATIFICATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS, supra
note 30, at 283-84; HENKIN, supra note 70, at 76; Bradley & Goldsmith, supranote 32, at 400
("Constitutional principles relating to separation of powers suggest that domestic federal law with
respect to human rights should be made through a lawmaking process that involves the House of
Representatives."); Buergenthal, supra note 43, at 147; Golove, supra note 59, at 581, 585.
Making a global challenge to the very notion of human rights treaties,
[conservatives] emphasized that human rights deal with the relationship between
a state and its own citizens, and they contended that the whole subject of human
rights in the United States was therefore appropriately a matter of concern only to
ourselves and not to other nations. This argument sounded largely in the
separation of powers, the main claim being that Congress, with the participation
of the House, properly regulates domestic rights, not the President and Senate
alone.
Id. at 585.
79. BUERGENTHAL, supra note 28, at 285; see Golove, supra note 59, at 585-86; Hannum &
Fischer, Conclusion,in U.S. RATIFICATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS,

supra note 30, at 283-84; Henkin, supra note 59, at 1024-32.
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Second, opponents of ratification argued that many of the rights
protected by human rights treaties were regulated in the United States by
state, rather than federal law."° They contended that ratification of the
human rights treaties would improperly federalize human rights legislation,
and violate separation of powers and federalism principles. 8' However, in
Missouri v. Holland,82 the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Tenth
Amendment does not limit the treaty-making power of the President and
the Senate because it is expressly delegated to them by the U.S.
Constitution.83

The problem with this contention is that, even assuming that the treaty-making
power applies only to matters that are of international concern, it cannot be
seriously contended that human rights fail to meet this test. The huge number of
international human rights agreements in force today, which have been ratified by
a substantial majority of the international community of states, attests to the
internationalization of the human rights concern. In short, the constitutional
standard about what is or is not a matter of international concern, assuming there
is in fact such a requirement, cannot be divorced from contemporary international
realities and diplomatic practice.
BUERGENTHAL, supra note 28, at 285 (citing Filartiga v. Pefla-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 302, cmt. c). See generallysupra text accompanying notes 58-60.
80. See BUERGENTHAL, supranote 28, at 285; ENGELLAND, supranote 61, at 35-37; HENKIN,
supra note 70, at 76; KAUFMAN, supra note 73, at 98-100, 108-10; VIRGINIA A. PRATT, THE
INFLUENCE OF DOMESTIC CONTROVERSY ON AMERICAN PARTICIPATION INTHE UNITED NATIONS
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 1946-1953, at 192 (1986); TANANBAUM, supra note 70, at 3-4;

Buergenthal, supra note 43, at 148; Golove, supra note 59, at 581, 585.
81. See BUERGENTHAL, supranote 28, at 285; ENGELLAND, supranote 6 1, at 35-37; HENKIN,
supra note 70, at 76; KAUFMAN, supra note 73, at 98-100, 108-10; PRATT, supranote 80, at 192;
TANANBAUM, supra note 70, at 3-4; Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 32, at 400 ("Constitutional
principles relating to federalism suggest that some matters should be regulated by state, rather than
federal, officials."); Buergenthal, supra note 43, at 148; Golove, supra note 59, at 581, 585.

[Conservatives] insisted that human rights treaties seek to deal with matters over
which Congress itself has no jurisdiction and which under the Tenth Amendment
are exclusively reserved to the states. If Congress could not regulate such matters
- here, they principally had racial segregation in mind - then the President and
Senate could not, they claimed, make a treaty that did.
Id. at 585. However, "[i]t is not all that clear, given the manner in which this argument is often put,
whether its proponents believe that this federalization would be unconstitutional or merely unwise."
BUERGENTHAL, supra note 28, at 285-86.

82. 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
83. Holland,252 U.S. at 432; see Buergenthal, supranote 43, at 148; Golove, supranote 59,
at 586-87, 602-03; supratext accompanying notes 62-65. But see KAUFMAN, supranote 73, at 100
("It could be argued, however, that Missouri v. Holland did not significantly alter what the
executive or Congress could do.").
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Finally, opponents of ratification argued that some provisions of the
human rights treaties were in conflict with the U.S. Constitution.84 This is
true of a very small number of treaty provisions.8 5 However, in those
situations, appropriate reservations may be made upon ratification to
ensure that the United States does not assume international obligations that
it would be unable constitutionally to implement on the domestic level.86
2. Political and Policy Arguments
While many of the arguments against ratification are framed in
constitutional terms,8 7 most of them boil down to political or policy-based
objections.88 Most of the groups that opposed ratification of the human

84. BUERGENTHAL, supranote 28, at 287; see Bradley & Goldsmith, supranote 32, at 400;
Buergenthal, supra note 43, at 148.
85. Buergenthal, supra note 43, at 148. For example, Article 20(1) of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which requires that "any advocacy of national, racial or
religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination... shall be prohibited by law," is in
conflict with the First Amendment. BUERGENTHAL, supra note 28, at 287; see U.S. CONST. amend.
I; ICCPR, supra note 6, art. 20(1).
86. BUERGENTHAL, supranote 28, at 287 (citing U.S. RATIFICATION OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS
TREATIES: WITH OR WITHOUT RESERVATIONS? (Richard B. Lillich ed., 1981); David P. Stewart,
U.S. Ratification of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: The Significance of the
Reservations, UnderstandingsandDeclarations,14 HuM. RTs. L.J. 77,79-81 (1993)); see Hannum
& Fischer, Conclusion, in U.S. RATIFICATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANTS ON HUMAN
RIGHTS, supra note 30, at 284-85; Buergenthal, supra note 43, at 148.
87. See supratext accompanying notes 77-86.
88. See Hannum & Fischer, Conclusion, in U.S. RATIFICATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL
COVENANTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 30, at 284 ("The arguments which would preclude
United States ratification on constitutional grounds are unpersuasive."); HENKIN, supra note 70,
at 76 ("Each of [the] legal objections was long ago refuted."); Henkin, supra note 59, at 1014-15;
Louis Henkin, The Covenant on Civil and PoliticalRights, in U.S. RATIFICATION OF THE HUMAN
RIGHTS TREATIES: WITH OR WITHOUT RESERVATIONS?, supra note 86, at 21.
In principle, there are no constitutional objections [to ratification]. The treaty
makers can adhere to the human rights covenants. There are no constitutional
objections based on federalism or the separation of powers or on some notion that
the subject is not of international concern.... The objections to ratification, then,
are not constitutional but political, and even constitutional arguments are made
principally for their political influence. The obstacle is an abiding and deep
isolationism....
Id. at 21.
[T]he argument that the United States is without power under the Constitution to
adhere to [human rights] treaties has no basis whatever - in the language of the
Constitution, in its travauxpreparatoires,in the institutions it established, in its
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rights treaties saw them as a threat to racially discriminatory state
legislation, which until then had withstood constitutional challenge. 9
Some opponents of U.S. adherence to human rights treaties argued that,
should the U.S. Supreme Court sometime in the future hold that treaties
were not subject to any constitutional limitations, Americans could be
deprived of their constitutional rights by human rights treaties.9" However,
the U.S. Supreme Court expressly rejected this argument in Reid v.
Covert.9'
Other opponents argued that human rights treaties would threaten
domestic sovereignty, and put the rights of Americans at the mercy of
' They
"alien international philosophies."92
were concerned that ratification
of human rights treaties would increase the U.S. international

principles of federalism or of separation of powers, in almost two centuries of
constitutional history, or in any other consideration relevant to constitutional
interpretation.
Id. at 1014-15.
89. See BUERGENTHAL, supra note 28, at 280-81; HENKIN, supra note 70, at 76.
90. BUERGENTHAL, supranote 28, at287-88; see ENGELLAND, supranote 61, at31-32,35-37;
KAUFMAN, supra note 73, at 96-97, 108; PRATT, supra note 80, at 199; TANANBAUM, supranote
70, at 24-25.
91. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1957); see supra text accompanying note 60.
92. PRAr, supra note 80, at 192, 199, 203-04; see ENGELLAND, supra note 61, at 32-37;
HENKIN, supra note 70, at 77; KAUFMAN, supra note 73, at 96, 110-14; Kuhner, supra note 30, at
444-51.
There is resistance to imposing national standards on some matters that have long
been deemed "local"; even more, there is resistance to accepting international
standards, and international scrutiny, on matters that have been for the United
States to decide. A deep isolationism continues to motivate many Americans, even
some who are eager to judge others as by interceding on behalf of human rights
in other countries. Human rights in the United States, they believe, are alive and
well. Americans, they believe, have nothing to learn, and do not need scrutiny
from others, surely not from the many countries where human rights fare so badly.
Moreover, they say, the United States would take human rights obligations
seriously, as others [sic] governments do not; in the United States, courts and
other institutions would give them effect, as does not happen in most other
countries. The United States, they argue, ought not join in a human rights
enterprise with countries that do not share its ideals, that will dilute American
standards, and that will use United States adherence as a pretext to distort and
criticize the human rights record of the United States.
HENKIN, supra note 70, at 77; see also Henkin, supra note 88, at 21.
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entanglements.93 Still others argued that ratification would allow the
United Nations to make U.S. law through self-executing treaties without
resorting to legislation by Congress.94 Most ofthese arguments build on the
differences between U.S. constitutional rights and international human
rights, and reflect the deep isolationism of American culture. 95
B. The Bricker Amendment and its Consequences
9 6 held that the
The California Supreme Court, in Sei Fujiiv. California,
human fights provisions of the U.N. Charter were nonself-executing, and
as such, could not supersede state law unless they were implemented by
federal legislation. 97 Despite that holding, those who saw the U.N. Charter
and other human rights treaties as threats to racially discriminatory state
legislation remained wary of U.S. ratification. 98 The most prominent
among them, Senator John W. Bricker of Ohio, 99 warned that "literally
thousands of Federal and State laws [would] automatically become
invalid" if Sei Fujii were overruled by the U.S. Supreme Court and the
human rights treaties were deemed self-executing.' 00 Senator Bricker
argued that "something must be done to prevent treaties from having such
far-reaching and unintended consequences."'01 What needed to be done,

93. KAUFMAN, supranote 73, at 114-15 ("Associated with the neo-isolationalism ofthe time
was an ethnocentric suspicion of foreign states and a fear of entangling alliances.").
94. Id. at 114.
95. HENKIN, supra note 70, at 76-77.
In particular, American constitutional rights are individualistic and deeply
democratic in their eighteenth-century conception. Self-government is the basic
right on which all others depend: Representativegovernment isfreedom, Thomas
Paine said. In contemporary international human rights, on the other hand, popular
sovereignty does not imply any particular system of government; individual
participation in government is only one right among others, and the form of
participation is not defined. Americans believe that societies that are not
democratic violate the basic human rights on which all others depend.
Id.
96. 242 P.2d 617 (Cal. 1952).
97. Sei Fujii, 242 P.2d at 620; see supra text accompanying notes 47-57; infra text
accompanying note 213.
98. BUERGENTHAL, supra note 28, at 280-81.
99. On the background of Senator Bricker and his political career, see generally TANANBAUM,
supra note 70, at 20-31.
100. 98 CONG. REc. 911 (1952); see BUERGENTHAL, supranote 28, at 281; KAUFMAN, supra
note 73, at 101-02; Buergenthal, supra note 43, at 145.
101. 98 CONG. REC.911 (1952); see BUERGENTHAL, supra note 28, at 281; KAUFMAN, supra
note 73, at 95-96; Buergenthal, supranote 43, at 145. There were two important dimensions of the
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according to Senator Bricker, was to amend the U.S. Constitution to limit
the treaty-making power.° 2
Senator Bricker introduced several drafts of the "Bricker Amendment"
in the Senate between 1952 and 1957,03 but all versions had the same three
basic aims" °4 First, the Bricker Amendment sought to make all
Bricker Amendment: "(1) a'substantive' concern about increasing U.S. involvement internationally
and (2) an 'institutional' dismay at the increased power and independence of the executive in
foreign affairs." KAUFMAN, supranote 73, at 95.
102. BUERGENTHAL, supra note 28, at 281; see PRATT, supra note 80, at 191; TANANBAUM,
supranote 70, at 15; Buergenthal, supranote 43, at 145; Golove, supra note 59, at 587; Sloss, The
Domesticationof InternationalHuman Rights, supra note 49, at 173.
The purpose of the Bricker Amendment was to create additional safeguards on
the power of the president to negotiate treaties and to conclude executive
agreements....
Both the supports and the opponents of the amendment based their positions on
appeals to the traditional meaning of the Constitution. Senator Bricker and his
supporters maintained that treaties and executive agreements could too easily be
used to give the federal government regulation over matters denied to it by the
Constitution. They were concerned that treaties such as the U.N. Covenant on
Human Rights would alter drastically the federal system of government, and would
put the rights of Americans at the mercy of alien international philosophies....
Those in opposition claimed that the amendment would destroy the traditional
constitutional balance of power as well as unnecessarily constrain the president in
the conduct of foreign relations. They denied that individual rights would be
threatened by the human rights covenant.
PRATT, supra note 80, at 191-93. For a list of the organizational supporters of the amendment, see
id. at 199-201.
103. See BUERGENTHAL, supranote 28, at 281; Hannum & Fischer, The PoliticalFramework,
in U.S. RATIFICATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANTS ON HUMAN RiGHTS, supra note 30, at
14; KAUFMAN, supranote 73, at 103-06; TANANBAUM, supranote 70, at 32-65; Buergenthal, supra
note 43, at 145; Sloss, The Domesticationof InternationalHuman Rights, supranote 49, at 173.
On the development and drafting ofthe amendment, including the involvement of the American Bar
Assnciatinn and especially its Committee on Peace and Law Through the United Nations, see
generally KAUFMAN, supra note 73, at 103-06; MORLEY, supra note 30, at 40-44; TANANBAUM,
supra note 70, at 15. The text of all proposed versions of the amendment are reproduced in
TANANBAUM, supranote 70, at 221-27; KAUFMAN, supranote 73, at 201-03 (reproducing the major
versions).
104. See Buergenthal, supranote 43, at 145. Even those three basic aims can be combined in
one overriding objective. See KAUFMAN, supranote 73, at 95 ("Although there are many different
reasons why various members of the Senate in the 1950s supported [the Bricker Amendment],
concern over the effect ofhuman rights treaties was in the forefront."); Bradley & Goldsmith, supra
note 32, at 412-13; Louis Henkin, U.S. Ratification of Human Rights Conventions: The Ghost of
Senator Bricker, 89 Am. J.INT'L L. 341, 348 (1995); Sloss, The Domestication of International
Human Rights, supra note 49, at 173 ("All of the proposals attempted, in different ways, to limit
the domestic legal effects of treaties and other international agreements.").
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international agreements nonself-executing under U.S. law.'° 5 This change
would mean that all treaties would require federal implementing legislation
before they could be enforced in U.S. courts." 6 It would also remove the
international human rights issue permanently from the courts'
jurisdiction.'17 Section 3 of the Bricker Amendment in its final form read,
"[a] treaty shall become effective as internal law in the United States only
through the enactment of appropriate legislation by the Congress.""1 °
Second, the Bricker Amendment sought to supersede Missouri v.
Holland,"° which held that the Tenth Amendment does not limit the treatymaking power of the President and the Senate since that power was
expressly delegated to them." 0 The holding in Hollandmeans that treaties
may federalize subjects previously within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
states."' Section 2 of the amendment strived to reverse that principle, and
in its final form stated,
[n]o treaty shall authorize or permit any foreign power or any
international organization to supervise, control, or adjudicate rights
of citizens of the United States within the United States enumerated
in this constitution or any other matter essentially within the
domestic jurisdiction of the United States.' 12

Senator Bricker... led a movement to amend the Constitution in ways
designed to make it impossible for the United States to adhere to human rights
treaties. The campaign for the Bricker Amendment apparently represented a move
by anti-civil-rights and "states' rights" forces to seek to prevent - in particularbringing an end to racial discrimination and segregation by international treaty.
...

Henkin, supra, at 348.
105. See Buergenthal, supra note 43, at 145; Henkin, supranote 104, at 347-48.
106. See Buergenthal, supra note 43, at 145; Henkin, supranote 104, at 348.
107. See KAuFmAN, supra note 73, at 172; supra text accompanying note 106.
108. KAUFMAN, supra note 73, at 101. For an analysis of section 3, see ENGELAND, supra
note 61, at 79-129 (discussing an early version of section 3, then designated section 2); KATFmAN,
supra note 73, at 101-02.
109. 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
110. Holland,252 U.S. at 433; see KAUFMAN, supranote 73, at 99-100; Buergenthal, supra
note 43, at 145, 148; Golove, supranote 59, at 586-87, 602-03; supratext accompanying notes 62-

65.
111. See BUERGENTHAL, supranote 28, at 281-82; Buergenthal, supra note 43, at 145; supra

text accompanying notes 62-65.
112. KAUFMAN, supra note 73, at 98-99 ("The purpose of this section was to restrain the
federal government from further encroaching upon states' rights via the treaty-making power.").
Senator Bricker stated,
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Finally, the Bricker Amendment would have provided expressly what
had always been implied: that international agreements are subject to those
restraints of the U.S. Constitution that limit all powers of the federal
government. 3 This was the holding of Reid v. Covert,"4 and the goal of
Section 1 of the amendment." 5 Section 1 in its final form stated, "[a]
provision of a treaty which denies or abridges any right enumerated in this
Constitution shall not be of any force or effect."' 6 Opponents of Section 1
argued simply
that it was unnecessary, because of the holding in Reid v.
7
Covert. 1

The Eisenhower Administration saw the Bricker Amendment as an
"intolerable encroachment on the President's foreign policy powers," and
feared that some version of the amendment might actually pass through the
Senate." 8 The administration made several political deals to obtain the
votes necessary to defeat the Bricker Amendment." 9 As a part of those
deals, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles made a policy commitment
that the United States did "not intend to become a party to any such

Section 2 prevents the President and the Senate from using treaties as an
instrument of domestic legislation without the participation of the House of
Representatives. In addition, section 2 protects the reserved powers of the states
by preventing Congress from acquiring by treaty legislative power which it does
not possess in the absence of treaty .... [It] reverses the doctrine of Missouri v.
Holland[, 252 U.S. 416 (1920),] which holds that a treaty may empower Congress
to legislate in areas prohibited by the Tenth Amendment in the absence of treaty.
Id. at 99-100. For an analysis of section 2, see id. at 98-101.
113. See BUERGENTHAL, supra note 28, at 282; Buergenthal, supra note 43, at 145-46.
114. 354 U.S. 1 (1957); see supra text accompanying note 60.
115. See supratext accompanying notes 113-14; infra text accompanying note 116.
116. KAuFMAN, supranote 73, at 96. For an analysis of section 1, including Senator Bricker's
own comments, see ENGELLAND, supranote 61, at 47-78 (discussing an early version of section 1);
K-AULFMALN, sunra note 73, at 96-98.
117. KAUFMAN, supra note 73, at 98.
118. Sloss, The Domesticationof InternationalHuman Rights, supranote 49, at 173. "There
was substantial consideration of [the amendment] during the 1950s. In fact, one of the proposed
amendments fell only one vote short of obtaining the necessary two-thirds vote in the Senate."
Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 32, at 413 (internal citation omitted); see Golove, supranote 59,
at 587. However, at that time, the proposed amendment no longer contained any of the provisions
that would have affected human rights treaties. Id. at 587.
119. See BUERGENTHAL, supra note 28, at 282; Buergenthal, supra note 43, at 146. For a
detailed account of the formal congressional deliberations, see KALUmAN, supranote 73, at 103-06;
TANANBAUM, supra note 70, at 80-156. On the defeat of the amendment, including a detailed
analysis of the votes, see generally TANANBAUM, supra note 70, at 157-190. On the effect of the
Bricker Amendment controversy on Eisenhower's leadership, see generally id. at 216-19.
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covenant [on human rights] or present it as a treaty for consideration by
the Senate."' 20
Many members of national and foreign governments saw the
announcement as a political concession and as a failure of the international
human rights movement.' 2 ' U.S. policy on human rights treaties would
soon change,'22 but the Bricker Amendment controversy undoubtedly
weakened international confidence in the U.S. commitment to human
rights.'23 The controversy also fostered lingering hostility in the Senate
towards U.S. ratification of human rights treaties.124
120. Hearingson S.J Res. 1 and S.J. Res. 43 Before a Subcomm. ofthe Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 825 (1953) (testimony of Senator Bricker); see BUERGENTHAL,
supra note 28, at 282; Hannum & Fischer, The PoliticalFramework,in U.S. RATIFICATION OF THE
INTERNATIONAL COVENANTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 30, at 15; KAUFMAN, supra note 73,
at 104; PRATT,supranote 80, at 221-22; Bradley & Goldsmith, supranote 32, at 413; Buergenthal,
supra note 43, at 146; Henkin, supranote 104, at 348; Sloss, The Domesticationof International
HumanRights, supranote 49, at 173-74. "Administration concern over the apparent strength of the
Bricker forces undoubtedly played the maj or role in the change in the American position.... There
can be no doubt ... that the policy reversal was a political tactic mandated by the Bricker
movement." PRATT,supra note 80, at 222. Dulles' commitment had a dual effect:
The short-term effect of the Bricker Amendment hearings, and ofthe public debate
surrounding them, was the defeat of efforts to ratify human rights treaties, most
explicitly contained in the Dulles policy statement of the Eisenhower
administration. This defeat was definite even though the Bricker Amendment did
not pass.... The long-term effect was also executive and legislative resistance to
action on human rights treaties.
KAUFMAN,

supra note 73, at 116; see also ENGELLAND, supra note 61, at 183-213.

On the one hand, [Dulles' statement] added legitimacy to the argument that the
treaty power should not be used to effect changes in domestic protection of human
rights. On the other hand, it helped defeat the move for a constitutional
amendment by persuading at least some Senators that restraint by the Executive
Branch, rather than a constitutional amendment, was the best way to ensure that
the United States would not domesticate human rights treaties.
Sloss, The Domesticationof InternationalHuman Rights, supra note 49, at 174. For more on the
position of the Eisenhower Administration during the early development of the amendment and
prior to its defeat, see generally MORLEY, supranote 30, at 44-48; PRATT, supranote 80, at210-11;
TANANBAUM, supra note 70, at 66-79.
121. See PRATT, supra note 80, at 223-28.
122. See infra text accompanying notes 125-40.
123. PRATT, supra note 80, at 229-31.
124. Sloss, The Domestication of International Human Rights, supra note 49, at 174
("Although Senator Bricker's effort to amend the Constitution failed, he succeeded in creating a
political environment in which the Senate was hostile towards U.S. ratification of human rights
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C. Compromise: OccasionalRatification with Reservations,
Understandings,andDeclarations
1.Occasional Ratification
The Eisenhower Administration respected its commitment to nonratification and did not request Senate consideration of any human rights
treaties, but the promise ended when Eisenhower left office. 12 In 1963,
President Kennedy reversed the Eisenhower policy and sent three human
rights treaties to the Senate, although the Senate did not hold hearings on
them until 1967.126
When the Senate did hold its hearings, two of the three
127
treaties passed.

During the mid-1970s, the U.S. Congress began to address the subject
of an effective international human rights system and laid the legislative
foundation for the current U.S. human rights policy. 28 The Carter
Administration made the promotion of human rights the focus of its
foreign policy, 29 and in 1977, during his first year in office, President
Carter personally signed three major human rights treaties 30 Every
President since Carter has urged the Senate to approve the ratification of
major human rights treaties.' 3 ' Still, until 1988, the Senate had not ratified
any major multilateral
human rights treaty, and today has ratified only four
32
such treaties. 1

treaties and suspicious of any attempt to use the treaty power to effect domestic social reforms.");
see also id.
at 172.
125. KAUFMAN, supra note 73, at 116, 196-97.
126. See id.at 119; Buergenthal, supranote 43, at 146.
127. KAUFMAN, supra note 73, at 119. Those two treaties were the Supplementary Convention
on the Abolition of Slavery and the Slave Trade, ratified in 1967, and the Convention on the
Political Rights of Women, ratified in 1975. BUERGENTHAL, supra note 28, at 283; KAUFMAN,
suprn note 73, at 119- For more on those treaties and the fate of the third, the Convention on the
Abolition of Forced Labor (which is not yet ratified), see generally id. at 119-47.
128. BUERGENTHAL, supra note 28, at 274; see Hannum & Fischer, Conclusion, in U.S.
RATIFICATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 30, at 285-89;
Buergenthal, supranote 43, at 142.
129. BUERGENTHAL, supra note 28, at 274; see Buergenthal, supra note 43, at 142. See
generallyHENKiN, supranote 70, at 70-72; A. GLENN MOWER, JR., HUMAN RIGHTS AND AMERICAN
FOREIGN POLICY: THE CARTER AND REAGAN EXPERIENCES (1987).
130. Buergenthal, supra note 43, at 146; see infra text accompanying notes 244-65; see infra
text accompanying notes 266-80; BUERGENTHAL, supra note 28, at 285.
131. Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 32, at 414.
132. BUERGENTHAL, supra note 28, at 276; see Bradley & Goldsmith, supranote 32, at 414;
infra text accompanying notes 245, 267-68, 283, 292, 299, 308, & 318.
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The Reagan Administration gradually recognized that it was in the
nation's interest to maintain the promotion of human rights as part of its
foreign policy. 133 In 1988, the Senate gave its advice and consent to the
ratification of the Genocide Convention,1 34 and President Reagan ratified
it shortly thereafter; this was the turning point in U.S. policy towards
human rights treaties. "' The Reagan Administration focused on support for
democratic institutions and elections, 136 and the George H. Bush and
Clinton Administrations strengthened this approach. 3 7 The Clinton
Administration expanded U.S. human rights policy to include efforts to
bolster138the rule of law and democracy, and to strengthen the rights of
labor.
The attitude of the United States on human rights treaties thus has
changed from a policy of total non-participation to one that proceeds on a
treaty-by-treaty basis in deciding whether to ratify a particular
instrument. 139 Recent administrations have realized that there are no
compelling constitutional objections to ratification of human rights
treaties. 4 ' But the decision whether to ratify a particular treaty takes
account of a number of factors, most importantly the domestic and foreign
policy interests in U.S. participation' 4 ' and the likelihood that the Senate
will give its advice and consent to ratification.'42
Recent administrations have realized that it is in the U.S. national and
international interests to adhere to human rights treaties. 4 3 In addition to
general considerations,'" there are at least four specific foreign policy
arguments for ratification of human rights treaties.'45 First, ratification
133. BUERGENTHAL, supra note 28, at 274; see Buergenthal, supra note 43, at 142. See
generally HENKIN, supra note 70, at 70-73; MOWER, supranote 129.
134. See infra text accompanying notes 283-85.
135. BUERGENTHAL, supra note 28, at 276.
136. Id.at275.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.at 290; see Buergenthal, supra note 43, at 141-42.
140. BUERGENTHAL, supra note 28, at 290.
141. Id at 290; see infra text accompanying notes 143-49.
142. BUERGENTHAL, supra note 28, at 290; see infra text accompanying notes 150-202.
143. BUERGENTHAL, supra note 28, at 290; see Henkin, supra note 104, at 349.
144. See generally Golove, supra note 59, at 605-18 (analyzing traditional foreign policy
reasons for ratifying human rights treaties, reasons pertaining to human rights practices abroad (the
"cosmopolitan moral concern"), reasons pertaining to the reform ofhuman rights practices at home,
and reasons rooted in global community and global process values).
145. See PRATT, supra note 80, at 260; Nigel Rodley, On the Necessity of United States
Ratificationofthe InternationalHumanRights Conventions,in U.S. RATIFICATION OF THE HUMAN
RIGHTS TREATIES: WITH OR WITHOUT RESERVATIONS?, supra note 86, at 5-14. See generally

Golove, supra note 59, at 618 ("There are, of course, many important foreign policy reasons for
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would resolve the glaring contradiction between the well-publicized U.S.
belief in individual rights and its refusal to ratify the covenants. 14 6 Second,
ratification would strengthen the influence of the United States in the
drafting of other multilateral human rights treaties. 147 Third, ratification
would set an example that might encourage other nations to improve their
domestic protection of human rights and to ratify the treaties. 148 Finally,

concluding human rights treaties, and it is almost inconceivable that a case would arise where there
wa. not a substantial foreign policy reason among the mix of reasons motivating the President and
Senate to ratify.").
146. PRATT, supra note 80, at 260-61; see Rodley, On the Necessity of United States
Ratificationof the InternationalHuman Rights Conventions, in U.S. RATIFICATION OF THE HUMAN
RIGHTS TREATIES: WITH OR WITHOUT RESERVATIONS?, supranote 86, at 5-14; Golove, supranote
59, at 606 ("[R]atifying human rights treaties bolsters the reputation and influence of the United
States in promoting human rights and in other fields by demonstrating its good faith and willingness
to undertake reciprocal obligations and its respect for the views of other nations.").
147. PRATT, supra note 80, at 260; see Rodley, On the Necessity ofUnitedStates Ratification
of the InternationalHuman Rights Conventions, in U.S. RATIFICATION OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS
TREATIES: WITH OR WITHOUT RESERVATIONS?, supranote 86, at 5-14; Bradley & Goldsmith, supra

note 32, at 414 (noting that non-ratification would preclude the United States from participating
in treaty-related institutions that influence the course of international human rights law); Golove,
supranote 59, at 606 ("[R]atification affords the United States access to the procedural mechanisms
created by the treaty to encourage respect for human rights in other countries (and enables the
United States to have greater influence over the direction in which human rights standards
develop).").
148. PRATT, supra note 80, at 260; see Rodley, On the Necessity of UnitedStates Ratification
of the InternationalHuman Rights Conventions, in U.S. RATIFICATION OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS
TREATIES: WITH OR WITHOUT RESERVATIONS?, supra note 86, at 5-14; Golove, supranote 59, at

605-06.
[T]he United States has compelling national interests in promotion respect of
human rights standards by other nations [1] because nations that violate
fumdanental human rights t-nd tn he mnrp aggrPQivP PytPrnAlly and iintahle
internally and, thus, undermine international peace and security; [2] because the
humanitarian and economic disasters that frequently accompany regimes that
systematically violate human rights have, and will continue, to force us to make
substantial financial and even military commitments when conflicts erupt; [3]
because regimes of this sort do not make good trading partners and disrupt the
flow of international commerce.... Furthermore, participating in human rights
treaty regimes is an important means of promoting respect for human rights
standards because ratification . . . strengthens the conventions by making

participation more universal and by lending them the pre-eminent influence of the
United States; and encourages other states to join.
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ratification would place the United States in a better position, both morally
and legally, to protest violations of human rights in other countries. 4 9
2. The Inclusion of Reservations, Understandings, and Declarations
To obtain the required political support of the Senate, recent
administrations have evolved a practice of addressing all real and potential
objections to a particular treaty provision by proposing numerous
reservations, understandings, and declarations (sometimes collectively
called RUDs) designed to overcome them. 5° The practice of including
reservations, understandings, and declarations in human rights treaties
began during the Carter Administration and continues today. 5 ' The
practice is driven by a combination of constitutional imperatives, legal
considerations, and political expediency. 5 2 It has become a tradition
insisted upon by the Senate and fully supported by every President since
Carter.'5 3 Furthermore, U.S. courts generally
uphold and apply
54
reservations, understandings, and declarations.

149. PRATT, supranote 80, at 261; see Rodley, On the Necessity of UnitedStatesRatification
of the InternationalHuman Rights Conventions, in U.S. RATIFICATION OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS
TREATIES: WITH ORWITHOUT RESERVATIONS?, supranote 86, at 5-14; Bradley & Goldsmith, supra
note 32, at 414 ("[N]onratifcation would create a 'troubling complication' in U.S. diplomacy,
namely, that the United States could not credibly encourage other nations to embrace human rights
norms if it had not itself embraced those norms."); Golove, supra note 59, at 606 ("[O]ur
international standing and reputation, and consequently our capacity to influence other states on
a range of foreign policy concerns (e.g., the global anti-terrorism coalition), may depend in part on
our willingness to show moral leadership on global human rights.").
150. BUERGENTHAL, supra note 28, at 291; see William A. Schabas, Spare the RUD or Spoil
the Treaty: The UnitedStates Challenges the Human Rights Committee on Reservations, in THE
UNITED STATES ANDHUMAN RIGHTS: LOOKINGINWARD AND OUTWARD 110-11 (David P. Forsythe
ed., 2000); Buergenthal, supra note 43, at 150; infra text accompanying notes 155-202.
151. BUERGENTHAL, supra note 28, at 291. See generally Dinah Shelton, Implementation
Issues Raisedby the ProposedUnitedStates Reservations, Understandings& Declarations,in U.S.
RATIFICATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS, supranote 30, at 269-77.
152. BUERGENTHAL, supra note 28, at 291; see Bradley & Goldsmith, supranote 32, at 416-17
("RUDs are designed to harmonize the treaties with existing requirements of U.S. law and to leave
domestic implementation of the treaties to Congress. They cover a variety of subjects and take a
variety of forms.").
153. BUERGENTHAL, supra note 28, at 291. For an analysis of reservations, understandings,
and declarations to particular treaties, see Schabas, supra note 150, at 112-15; Shelton,
Implementation Issues Raised by the Proposed United States Reservations, Understandings &
Declarations,in U.S. RATIFICATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS, supra
note 30, at 269-77.
154. E.g., Zheng v. Ashcroft, 332 F.3d 1186, 1196 (9th Cir. 2003) (giving effect to an
understanding attached to the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, as the "unambiguously expressed intent of Congress"); Beazley v.
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a. The Nature and Legal Effect of Reservations,
Understandings, and Declarations
Although reservations, understandings, and declarations are usually
analyzed collectively, each type of provision has a distinct meaning and
purpose, both by its nature and by its legal effect on the treaty.155 However,
it matters much less what a nation labels a provision than what the
provision actually purports to accomplish. 56
' Under U.S. constitutional law,
reservations, understandings, and declarations are always binding on U.S.
courts as a matter of domestic law, so long as15 7they are within the
constitutional power of the treaty-makers to adopt.
A reservation allows a nation to ratify a treaty while opting out of a
specific provision, and "is designed to modify the terms of the treaty as
between the reserving" nation and the nations "accepting the reservation[,]
to the extent of the reservation." '58 A reservation thus changes the
Johnson, 242 F.2d 248, 266-68 (5th Cir. 2001) (upholding the validity of the Senate's nonselfexecution declaration to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights); United States
v. Davis, 2003 WL 1837701, at *15 (E.D. La. 2003) (applying death penalty reservations to the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination); Domingues v. Nevada, 961 P.2d 1279, 1280
(Nev. 1998) (holding that the Senate's reservation to the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights negates petitioner's claim that the treaty renders his sentence illegal).
155. See, e.g., BUERGENTHAL, supra note 28, at 291-92; infra text accompanying notes 15863.
156. See, e.g., Vienna Convention, supra note 30, art. 2(1)(d); BUERGENTHAL, supra note 28,
at 291-92; Schabas, supranote 150, at 112; Richard W. Edwards, Jr., Reservations to Treaties, 10
MICH. J. INT'L L. 362, 368-72 (1989); Catherine Logan Piper, Note, Reservations to Multilateral
Treaties: The Goal of Universality, 71 IOWA L. REv. 295, 299 (1985).
157. BUERGENTHAL, supranote 28, at 292; see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) §§ 313, 314.
158. BUERGENTHAL, supra note 28, at 291; see Edwards, supra note 156, at 363; Riesenfeld
& Abbott, supra note 30, at 585; Piper, supra note 156, at 298.
A reservation is a formal declaration made by a state when it joins a treaty, a
declaration that acts to limit or modify the effect of the treaty in application to the
reserving state. A reservation is external to the text of the treaty and is an attempt
to alter the negotiated package. Because reservations are made outside ofthe treaty
negotiations, their amendment to the multilateral treaty may conflict with the
original text of the treaty. The ultimate effect of the reservation will depend on the
practice or rule ofreservations applied and the existence or nonexistence ofspecial
provisions within the treaty governing inclusion and effect of reservations.
Piper, supra note 156, at 298 (citing 14 DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW § 17, at 137-38 (M.
Whiteman ed. 1970); T. EuAs, THE MODERN LAW OFTREATIES 27 (1974); I. SINcLAIR, THE VIENNA
CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES 51 (2d ed. 1984)); see also Gillian Triggs, Australia's
Ratifications of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Endorsement or
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international obligations of the reserving nation and the nations accepting
the reservation. 59 In U.S. law, "reservations are Senate qualifications that
alter U.S. obligations under a treaty without changing the actual treaty
language."' 6 °
Understandings and declarations, on the other hand, are unilateral
statements by a nation regarding its interpretation of or position on a
particular provision of a treaty.' 6 ' Thus, they do "not modify a state's
Repudiation?, 31 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 278, 280 (1982). The Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties defines "reservation" as
a unilateral statement, however phrased or named, made by a State, when signing,
ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to a treaty, whereby it purports to
exclude or to modify the legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty in their
application to that State.
Vienna Convention, supra note 30, art. 2(l)(d).
Reasons for reservations include:
l. A State or international organization may wish to be a party to an international
agreement while at the same time not yielding on certain substantive points
believed to be against its interests.
2. A State or international organization may wish to be a party to an international
agreement while at the same time not binding itself to certain procedural
obligations, such as compulsory settlement of disputes in the forms specified in a
compromissory clause.
3. A State may wish to assure that its treaty obligations are compatible with
peculiarities of its local law.
4. A State may want to preclude a treaty's application to subordinate political
entities in a federal system or to foreign territories for which the State would
otherwise have international responsibility.
Edwards, supra note 156, at 363.
159. BUERGENTHAL, supra note 28, at 291; see Piper, supra note 156, at 298. On the status
of reservations in international treaty law, see Vienna Convention, supra note 30, arts. 19-21;
Riesenfeld & Abbott, see generally supra note 30, at 586-89.
160. Kennedy, supra note 30, at 99; see Riesenfeld & Abbott, supra note 30, at 589-90.
161. BUERGENTHAL, supra note 28, at 291; see Riesenfeld & Abbott, supra note 30, at 585
(defining understanding as "an interpretation, clarification, or elaboration assumed to be consistent
with the obligations of the treaty as submitted" and declaration as "a statement of policy, purpose,
or position related to the subject matter of the treaty but not necessarily affecting its provisions");
Piper, supranote 156, at 298-99.
The term "understanding" is used to designate a statement not intended to alter
or limit the effect of the treaty, but rather to set forth a state's interpretation or
explanation of a treaty provision. In practice, understandings are sometimes used
to provide a memorandum of the nation's interpretation at the time of signing in
case of future judicial or arbitral proceedings.
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international obligations.', 162 In U.S. law, "[u]nderstandings and
declarations are typically either interpretations [of] treaty language that
tend to narrow the scope of U.S. obligations under the treaty, or statements
preventing particular provisions from taking binding [domestic] effect in
the United States. ' 63
b. Categories of U.S. Reservations, Understandings, and Declarations
The United States routinely attaches certain categories of reservations,64
understandings, and declarations to all human rights treaties it ratifies.
The United States attempts through this practice "to ensure that it has
assumed no international human rights obligations not already guaranteed
by U.S. law" and to ensure that domestic implementation of human rights
treaties is left to Congress. 165 Professor Louis Henkin asserts that U.S.
reservations, understandings, and declarations are guided by several
"principles:"
1. The United States will not undertake any treaty obligation that it
will not be able to carry out because it is inconsistent with the
United States Constitution.
2. United States adherence to an international human rights treaty
should not effect - or promise - change in existing U.S. law or
practice.
4. Every human rights treaty to which the United States adheres
should be subject to a "federalism clause" so that the United States
could leave implementation of the convention largely to the states.

A declaration is a unilateral statement of policy or opinion that, like an
understanding, is not intended to alter or limit any provision of the treaty. It is
considered to have the least effect on the original treaty text and is used primarily
to articulate a signatory's purpose, position, or expectation, concerning the treaty
in question.
Piper, supra note 156, at 298-99 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 147(1)(f); DIGEST OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW § 17, supra note 158, at 137-38; SINCLAIR, supra note 158, at 52-53; D.M.
McRae, The Legal Effect of InterpretiveDeclarations,49 BRIT.Y.B. INT'L L. 155, 155 (1978)).
162. BUERGENTHAL, supranote 28, at 291; see Piper, supranote 156, at 298-99. On the status
of understandings and declarations in international law, see Riesenfeld & Abbott, supra note 30,
at 602-03.
163. Kennedy, supranote 30, at 99; see id.at 106-09, 122. On the status of understandings
and declarations in U.S. domestic law, see Riesenfeld & Abbott, supra note 30, at 603-19.
164. BUERGENTHAL, supra note 28, at 292.
165. See id. at 296-97; Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 32, at 416-17.
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5. Every international
human rights agreement should be "non-self166
executing.'
This approach, for all practical purposes, accomplishes the goals that the
Bricker Amendment sought to achieve: human rights
treaties are rendered
167
nonself-executing, and cannot preempt state laws.
First, certain substantive reservations are attached to any treaty
provisions that might conflict with the U.S. Constitution. 6 This problem
most often arises when a treaty provision may conflict with the First
Amendment. 69 The United States attached this type of reservation to its
17
ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
and the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment.' Under accepted constitutional
jurisprudence, none of the three branches "can give effect to a treaty
provision that is inconsistent with the" U.S. Constitution. 7 1 Thus, these
reservations are appropriate and probably necessary to avoid an
international obligation "that the United States could not carry out because
of

constitutional

limitations.'17

"Other

substantive

reservations,

[however,] are based not on a constitutional conflict but rather on a
political or policy disagreement with certain" treaty provisions, and

166. Henkin, supranote 104, at 341; see Kennedy, supranote 30, at 89-90; see also Sloss, The
DomesticationofInternationalHuman Rights, supranote 49, at 172 ("The U.S. strategy regarding
treaty reservations can best be understood as an effort to reconcile two conflicting policy objectives:
(1) ensuring that the United States would be able to comply with its treaty obligations; and (2)
preventing human rights treaties from altering domestic law.").
167. BUERGENTHAL, supra note 28, at 296; see Henkin, supra note 104, at 349; supra text
accompanying notes 105-16.
168. BUERGENTHAL, supranote 28, at 292; see Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 32, at 41718; Henkin, supra note 104, at 342; van der Vyver, supra note 48, at 780-82.
169. BUERGENTHAL, supra note 28, at 292; see Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 32, at 417;
van der Vyver, supra note 48, at 780-82.
170. U.S. Senate Resolution of Advice and Consent to Ratification of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 138 CoNG. REC. S4781-84 (1992) (enacted) [hereinafter
U.S. RUDs to ICCPR], available at http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/usdocs/ civilres.html (last
visited Oct. 30,2004); see BUERGENTHAL, supranote 28, at 293; Bradley & Goldsmith, supranote
32, at 417; van der Vyver, supra note 48, at 780-82; infra text accompanying notes 244-65.
171. U.S. Senate Resolution of Advice and Consent to Ratification ofthe Convention Against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 136 CoNG. REC. S 17486
(1990) (enacted) [hereinafter US. RUDs to CAT], available at http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrtsL/
usdocs/tortres.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2004); see BUERGENTHAL, supra note 28, at 293; van der
Vyver, supra note 48, at 780-82; infra text accompanying notes 306-15.
172. Henkin, supra note 104, at 342; see van der Vyver, supra note 48, at 780-82.
173. Henkin, supra note 104, at 342; see van der Vyver, supra note 48, at 780-82.
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probably are not as appropriate or necessary." 4 These types of reservations
were also attached to the U.S. ratification of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights.75 and the Convention Against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment."76
Second, certain reservations and understandings are attached to any
treaty provision "that is in conflict with existing U.S. law or that would
require the [United States] to conform its law to the treaty standard."' 77 By
these reservations, the United States "seeks to assure that its adherence to
[a human rights treaty] will not change[,] or require change in U.S. laws,
policies, or practices[,] even where they fall below international
standards."' 78 The propriety of these reservations is questionable; if all
nations entered reservations designed to reject any obligation to rise above
existing law and practice, human rights treaties would be futile.'79
Moreover, U.S. reservations designed to refuse higher international
standards often are more far-reaching than necessary.' 80 The United States
attached these types of reservations to its ratification of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,' 8' the Convention Against Torture
and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,'82 and
the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide.' 83

174. See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 32, at 417-18; van der Vyver, supra note 48, at
780-82.
175. U.S. RUDs to ICCPR, supranote 170; see Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 32, at 417;
van der Vyver, supranote 48, at 780-82; infra text accompanying notes 244-65.
176. U.S. RUDs to CAT, supranote 171; see Bradley & Goldsmith, supranote 32, at 417-18;
van der Vyver, supra note 48, at 780-82; infra text accompanying notes 306-15.
177. BUERGENTHAL, supra note 28, at 293; see Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 32, at 41819; Henkin, supra note 104, at 341-42; van der Vyver, supra note 48, at 783.
178. Henkin, supranote 104, at 342; see van der Vyver, supra note 48, at 783.
179. Henkin, supranote 104, at 343.
180. Id. at 344.
181. U.S. RUDs to ICCPR, supranote 170; see Bradley & Goldsmith, supranote 32, at 418;
van der Vyver, supra note 48, at 783-84; infra text accompanying notes 244-65.
182. U.S. RUDs to CAT, supranote 171; see Bradley & Goldsmith, supranote 32, at 418-19;
infra text accompanying notes 306-15.
183. U.S. Senate Resolution of Advice and Consent to Ratification of the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 132 CONG. REc. S 1355 (1986) [hereinafter
U.S. RUDs to Genocide Convention], availableathttp://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/usdocs/genres.
html (last visited Oct. 30, 2004); see Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 32, at 418-19; infra text
accompanying notes 281-89.
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Third, the United States uniformly attaches an understanding containing
a "federalism clause" to any human rights treaty it ratifies. 18 4 This
understanding seeks to prevent the application of the rule of Missouri v.
Holland, that a treaty may federalize a subject previously within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the states.'85 The understanding makes clear that
ratification does not effect federal preemption of all matters to which the
treaty applies, but recognizes the international obligation of the United
States to fulfill the terms of the treaty.'86 Federalism understandings "serve
no legal purpose" in international law."87 The United States attached
federalism understandings to its ratification of the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights' 88 and the International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. 8 9
Finally, the United States routinely attaches to human rights treaties a
declaration that the United States considers the treaty's substantive
provisions to be nonself-executing.190 This nonself-execution declaration
is directed mainly towards U.S. courts, rather than other nations.' 9' The
184. BUERGENTHAL, supra note 28, at 294; Schabas, supra note 150, at 112; see Bradley &
Goldsmith, supra note 32, at 422; Henkin, supra note 104, at 341, 345; van der Vyver, supranote
48, at 785-87.
185. BUERGENTHAL, supranote 28, at 295; see Henkin, supra note 104, at 345-46; supratext
accompanying notes 62-65.
186. BUERGENTHAL, supra note 28, at 295.
187. See Henkin, supra note 104, at 346 ("[S]ome see such declarations as another sign that
the United States is resistant to international human rights agreements, setting up obstacles to their
implementation and refusing to treat human rights conventions as treaties dealing with a subject of
national interest and international concern."). See generally Edward T. Swaine, Does Federalism
Constrainthe Treaty Power?, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 403 (2003).
188. U.S. RUDs to ICCPR, supra note 170; see Bradley & Goldsmith, supranote 32, at 422;
infra text accompanying notes 244-65.
189. U.S. Senate Resolution of Advice and Consent to Ratification of the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 140 CONG. REC. S7634 (1994) (enacted)
[hereinafter U.S. RUDs to CERD], availableat http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/usdocs/racialres.
htmlusres.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2004); see BUERGENTHAL, supra note 28, at 294-95; infratext
accompanying notes 290-96.
190. BUERGENTHAL, supra note 28, at 295; see Schabas, supra note 150, at 112; Shelton,
Implementation Issues Raised by the Proposed United States Reservations, Understandings&
Declarations,in U.S. RATIFICATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS, supra

note 30, at 275-77; Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 32, at 419-22; Henkin, supranote 104, at 341,
346-48; van der Vyver, supra note 48, at 789. The United States has also included nonselfexecution declarations in the following nonhuman-rights treaties: Convention on Commerce, Jan.
20, 1883, U.S.-Mex., 24 Stat. 975; Convention on Commercial Relations, Dec. 11, 1902, U.S.Cuba, 33 Stat. 2136; Treaty on Prisoner Transfer, Nov. 25, 1976, U.S.-Mex., 28 U.S.T. 7399.
Kennedy, supra note 30, at 90 n.3.
191. Henkin, supra note 104, at 346 ("As the reservations designed to deny international
obligations serve to immunize the United States from external judgment, the declaration that a
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first purpose of the nonself-execution declaration is to ensure that the
particular treaty does not "create rights directly enforceable in U.S. courts,"
in the absence of implementing legislation.1 92 The second purpose of the
declaration is to ensure that all changes "in the scope of domestic rights
protections" are made by legislation, with the participation of the House of
Representatives.' 93 The United States has included a nonself-execution
declaration in its ratification of every major human rights treaty it has
ratified: the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 94 the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide,195 the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Racial Discrimination, 196 and the Convention Against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. 97
The use of reservations, understandings, and declarations is widely
criticized. 9 The most common argument against the practice is that
reservations, understandings, and declarations are improper because they
are "an attempt by the United States to ratify" human rights treaties without
undertaking any real obligations.' 99 Another common argument is that the
U.S. reservations, understandings, and declarations violate human rights
treaties' object and purpose and therefore violate the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties. 2" Finally, some critics argue that the use of
reservations, declarations, and understandings threatens the integrity of
international human rights law and shows disrespect for treaty obligations

convention shall be nonself-executing is designed to keep its own judges from judging the human
rights conditions in the United States by international standards.").
192. BUERGENTHAL, supranote 28, at 295; see Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 32, at 41922; Henkin, supra note 104, at 346.
193. See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 32, at 420.
194. U.S. RUDs to ICCPR, supranote 170; see infra text accompanying notes 244-65.
195. U.S. RUDs to Genocide Convention, supra note 183; see van der Vyver, supranote 48,
at 789; infra text accompanying notes 281-89.
196. U.S. RUDs to CERD, supra note 189; infra text accompanying notes 290-96.
197. U.S. RUDs to CAT, supra note 171; infra text accompanying notes 306-15.
198. See, e.g., Schabas, supranote 150, at 110-11. See generally Elena A. Baylis, General
Comment 24: Confrontingthe Problem of Reservations to Human Rights Treaties, 17 BERKELEY
J. INT'LL. 277, 306-09 (1999); Damrosch, supranote 48; Fain, supra note 16; Amy C. Harfeld, Oh
Righteous Delinquent One: The United States' InternationalHuman Rights Double StandardExplanation, Example, andAvenues for Change, 4 N.Y. CrrY L. REv. 59 (2001); Henkin, supra
note 104; Kennedy, supra note 30; Riesenfeld & Abbott, supra note 30; Vazquez, Laughing at
Treaties, supra note 48; van der Vyver, supra note 48.
199. See, e.g., Bradley& Goldsmith, supra note 32, at 427-28; supratext accompanying note
198.
200. See, e.g., Bradley & Goldsmith, supranote 32, at 429-39; supra text accompanying note
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and international law in general. 20 1 However, some commentators do
support the practice." 2

IV. THE MAJOR MULTILATERAL HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES AND THEIR
STATUS IN THE UNITED STATES

U.N. organizations negotiate and administer most of the major
multilateral human rights treaties.20 3 The treaties provide for a wide range
of individual rights,2" and many establish governing bodies to oversee
their operation and to monitor compliance with them.20 5 This part examines
the substantive provisions of the major multilateral human rights treaties,
and discusses the status of each in the United States.20 6
A. U.N. Charterand UniversalDeclarationof Human Rights

The U.N. Charter2 0 7 has been in force since 1945 and is the governing
document of the United Nations. It lists a variety of general purposes for
the organization, including "[t]o achieve international cooperation in
solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or
humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for
human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as

to race, sex, language, or religion. 20 8 To effect that purpose, the U.N.
Charter provides for specific promotion of human rights by the United
Nations. 2' All 191 members 210 of the United Nations promise to take joint
201. See, e.g., Bradley & Goldsmith, supranote 32, at 464-67; supratext accompanying note
198.
202. See, e.g., Arthur Rovine & Jack Goldklang, Defense of Declarations,Reservations, and
Understandings, in U.S. RATIFICATION OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES: WITH OR WITHOUT
RESERVATIONS?, supra note 86, at 54-67; Bradley & Goldsmith, supranote 32; Edwards, supra
note 156.
203. On the institutions and process of U.N. human rights lawmaking, see Philip Alston,
Appraising the United Nations Human Rights Regime, in THE UNITED NATIONS AND HUMAN
RIGHTS: A CRITICALAPPRAISAL 1-21 (Philip Alston ed., 1992); THEODOR MERON, HUMAN RIGHTS
LAW-MAKING IN THE UNITED NATIONS: A CRITIQUE OF INSTRUMENTS AND PROCESS 272-279

(1986).
204. See infra text accompanying notes 228-39,248-58,270-78,286-89,294-95,302-04,31114, & 320-29.
205. See infratext accompanying notes 214-18, 296, 305, 315, & 326.
206. See infra text accompanying notes 207-329.
207. U.N. CHARTER.

208. Id., art. 1, para. 3.
209. Id. art. 55.
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and separate action in cooperation with the organization for the
achievement of the general and specific purposes. 21' The United States has
ratified the U.N. Charter,21 2 but at least one court has held that its
provisions on human rights are nonself-executing.213
The U.N. Charter establishes the Economic and Social Council
(ECOSOC), 14 which has many responsibilities relating to the protection
With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being which are
necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations based on respect for
the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, the United Nations
shall promote:
a. higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions of economic and
social progress and development;
b. solutions of international economic, social, health, and related problems;
and international cultural and educational cooperation; and
c. universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental
freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.
Id.
210. See United Nations, United Nations Treaty Collection (2005), at http://untreaty.un.org
[hereinafter U.N. Web Site](giving current status of the U.N. Charter, including the original parties
and their respective dates of ratification, accession, or succession).
211. U.N. CHARTER art. 56. "All Members pledge themselves to take joint and separate action
in cooperation with the Organization for the achievement of the purposes set forth in Article 55."
Id.
212. U.N. Web Site, supra note 210.
213. See Sei Fujii v. State, 242 P.2d 617, 620-21 (Cal. 1952). The Sei Fujii court stated,
It is clear that the provisions of the preamble and of Article I of the charter... are
not self-executing. They state general purposes and objectives of the United
Nations Organization and do not purport to impose legal obligations on the
individual member nations or to create rights in private persons. It is equally clear
that none of the other provisions relied on by plaintiff [including Articles 55 and
56] is self-executing.
Id. But see Oyama v. State of California, 332 U.S. 633, 649-50 (1948) (Black, J., concurring).
[W]e have recently pledged ourselves to cooperate with the United Nations to
"promote universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental
freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion." How
can this nation be faithful to this international pledge if state laws which bar land
ownership and occupancy by aliens on account of race are permitted to be
enforced?
Id. (Black, J., concurring) (citing U.N. CHARTER arts. 55(c), 56). For an analysis of nonselfexecution, see infra text accompanying notes 335-445.
214. U.N. CHARTER arts. 61-72; see Alston, Appraising the United Nations Human Rights
Regime, in THE UNITED NATIONS AND HuMAN RIGHTS: A CRITicAL APPRAISAL, supranote 203, at
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of human rights,21 5 one of which is to draft binding human rights treaties.2 16
The U.N. Charter also provides for the establishment of the Commission
on Human Rights (HRC)21 7 to carry out the human rights functions of the
ECOSOC.218 The first task of the HRC was to formulate an International
Bill of Rights,219 which now consists of the human rights provisions of the
U.N. Charter,22 ° the Universal Declarations of Human Rights (UDHR),22 1
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 222 and its

5. See generally Declan O'Donovan, The Economic and Social Council, in THE UNITED NATIONS

AND HUMAN RIGHTS: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL, supra note 203, at 107-25.
215. U.N. CHARTER arts. 62-66.
216. Id. art. 62, para. 1-4.
217. Id. art. 68. "The Economic and Social Council shall set up commissions in economic and
social fields and for the promotion of human rights, and such other commissions as may be required
for the performance of its functions." Id. The ECOSOC thus is entitled to create whatever
subsidiary mechanisms it considers necessary to carry out its responsibilities and functions under
the Charter. Alston, Appraisingthe UnitedNationsHuman Rights Regime, in THE UNITEDNATIONS
AND HUMAN RIGHTS: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL, supra note 203, at 9. While the ECOSOC is
considered a "principal organ" because it is specifically provided for in the U.N. Charter, the HRC
is considered a "functional commission," because it was established by the ECOSOC under Article
68. Id. at 5, 9. See generally Philip Alston, The Commission on Human Rights, in THE UNITED
NATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: ACRITICALAPPRAISAL, supranote 203, at 126-210; BUERGENTHAL,

supra note 28, at 79-82; CARTER ET AL., supra note 30, at 783-84.
218. The HRC's work was directed towards: "formulation of an international bill of rights;
formulation of recommendations for an international declaration on such matters as civil liberties,
status ofwomen, and freedom of information; protection ofminorities; prevention ofdiscrimination
on grounds of race, sex, language, or religion; and any matters within the field of human rights
considered likely to impair the general welfare or friendly relations among nations." Alston, The
Commission on Human Rights, in THE UNITED NATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: A CRITICAL

APPRAISAL, supra note 203, at 127 (citing Report of the PreparatoryCommission of the United
Nations, ch. 3, § 4,
14-16, U.N. Doc. PC/20 (1945)).
219. BUERGENTHAL, supra note 28, at 28 (citing Louis Henkin, The InternationalBill of
Rights: The Universal Declaration and the Covenants, in INTERNATIONAL ENFORCEMENT OF

HUMAN RIGHTS 1 (R. Bernhardt & J.A. Jolowicz eds., 1987)).
220. See supratext accompanying notes 208-09.
221. UDHR, supra note 5, see infratext accompanying notes 225-43.
222. ICCPR, supra note 6, see infra text accompanying notes 244-59.
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Optional Protocols,223 and the International Covenant on Economic, Social,
and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).2 24
Although the U.N. Charter reflects a commitment to promoting human
rights, it does not define those rights. But in 1948 the U.N. General
Assembly adopted the UDHR,22 5 which sets forth a "common standard of
achievement for all peoples and all nations, 22 6 giving specific effect to the
general provisions of the U.N. Charter. 227 The UDHR lists a variety of
political, social, economic, and cultural rights, including a right to take part
in government; 228 equal protection of the law;229 a right to life, liberty, and
security of person; 230 a right to a fair trial; 231' a right against arbitrary arrest,
exile, or detention; 23 2 a right to privacy; 233 rights to own property and to be
free from its arbitrary deprivation; 23 4 freedom of thought, conscience,
religion, and expression; 23 5 a right to an adequate standard of living; 236 and
a right to an education. 23 7 It also prohibits slavery and servitude, 238 torture,
and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, or punishment.23 9

223. Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
aiming at the abolition of the death penalty, opened for signature Dec. 15, 1989, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/44/128 (enteredintoforce July 11, 1991; not yet ratified by the United States) [hereinafter
Second Optional Protocol], availableathttp://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/ instree/b5ccprp2.htm (last
visited Mar. 28, 2005). Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, openedfor signatureDec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered intoforce Mar. 23, 1976;
not yet ratified by the United States) [hereinafter First Optional Protocol], available at
http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/b4ccprpl.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2005); see infra text
accompanying notes 262-65.
224. ICESCR, supranote 7; see infra text accompanying notes 266-80.
225. U.N. Web Site, supranote 210. See generally Jack Greenberg, Race, Sex, andReligious
Discrimination in InternationalLaw, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: LEGAL AND
POLICY ISSUES 311-13 (Theodor Meron ed., 1984); Richard B. Lillich, Civil Rights, in HUMAN
RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: LEGAL AND POLICY ISSUES, supra, at 115-61; infra text
accompanying notes 241, 248.
226. UDHR, supra note 5, pmbl.
227. See, eg,CARTER ET AL., supra note 30, at 770.
228. UDHR, supra note 5, art. 21, para. 1.
229. Id.art. 7.
230. Id art. 3.
231. Id.arts. 10, 11.
232. Id.art. 9.
233. UDHR, supra note 5, art. 12.
234. Id. art. 17, paras. 1,2.
235. Id. arts. 18, 19.
236. Id. art. 25, para. 1.
237. Id. art. 26, paras. 1-3.
238. UDHR, supranote 5, art. 4.
239. Id. art. 5.
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The UDHR is a General Assembly Resolution, not a treaty, and thus is
not a binding document per se.24° But courts and commentators agree that
its provisions bind at least the members of the United Nations.2 4 ' The
United States is a member of the United Nations 24 2 and thus is bound by
the provisions of the UDHR.243
B. InternationalCovenant on Civil and PoliticalRights and the
OptionalProtocols
The ICCPR has been in force since 1976, and currently has 151
parties. 2 " The United States ratified the ICCPR in 1992.245 However, the
ratification was subject to several reservations, understandings, and

240. See, e.g, BUERGENTHAL, supra note 28, at 33; CARTER ET AL., supra note 30, at 771.
241. The UDHR is considered binding on at least two separate grounds. See generally
BUERGENTHAL, supra note 28, at 33-38; Greenberg, Race, Sex, andReligious Discriminationin
InternationalLaw, in HUMAN RIGHTS ININTERNATIONAL LAW: LEGAL AND POLICY ISSUES, supra
note 225, at 313-18. First, it is binding on the parties to the U.N. Charter as an authoritative
interpretation of the Charter, setting out in detail the meaning of the phrase "human rights and
fundamental freedoms" in Article 55 of the Charter. See, e.g, Filartiga v. Pefla-Irala, 630 F.2d 876,
883 (2d Cir. 1980); BUERGENTHAL, supra note 28, at 33-36; CARTER ET AL., supra note 30, at 771;
Sohn, supra note 1, at 14-17. The circuit court in Filartigaexplained:
[s]ince [the UDHR's] adoption, members can no longer contend that they do not
know what human rights they promised in the Charter to promote. Moreover, a
U.N. Declaration is... a formal and solemn instrument, suitable for rare occasions
when principles of great and lasting importance are being enunciated.
Accordingly, it has been observed that the [UDHR] no longer fits into the
dichotomy of"binding treaty" against "non-binding pronouncement," but is rather
an authoritative statement of the international community. Thus, a Declaration
creates an expectation of adherence....
Filartiga,630 F.2d at 883 (internal quotations and citations omitted). Second, its provisions are
binding on all nations as a matter of customary international law. See, e.g., id.; BUERGENTHAL,
supra note 28, at 36-38; Sohn,supra note 1, at 14-17.
242. U.N. Web Site, supra note 210.
243. See supra text accompanying note 241.
244. For a list of the participants (including signatories and parties), their dates of signature
and ratification, any reservations, and any territorial applications, see U.N. Web Site, supra note
210. For a critique of the treaty, see MERON, supra note 203, at 83-127.
245. U.N. Web Site, supra note 210.
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declarations, including a nonself-execution declaration.246 The United
States has not yet enacted implementing legislation for the ICCPR.247
The ICCPR guarantees a broad list of civil and political rights,24 8
including: a right of self-determination; 249 protection against
discrimination;25 ° a right to life; 251 a right of privacy; 25 2 freedom of thought,
conscience, expression and religion;253 and rights of association and
assembly. 25 4 The ICCPR also prohibits torture, 255 slavery, 25 6 and cruel,

inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment.257 The treaty obligates
parties to provide an effective remedy for any person whose rights under
the treaty are violated. 25" As prescribed by the ICCPR, the ECOSOC

246. U.S. RUDs to ICCPR, supra note 170. "The Senate's advice and consent is subject to the
following declarations: (1) That the United States declares that the provisions of Articles 1 through
27 of the Covenant are not self-executing." Id. III(l).
247. Hain v. Gibson, 287 F.3d 1224, 1243 (10th Cir. 2002) (citing Buell v. Mitchell, 274 F.3d
337, 372 (6th Cir. 2001); Beazley v. Johnson, 242 F.3d 248, 267-68 (5th Cir. 2001)).
248. BUERGENTHAL, supra note 28, at 38-43; CARTER ET AL., supra note 30, at 774; see
Greenberg, Race, Sex, and Religious Discriminationin InternationalLaw, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW: LEGAL AND POLICY ISSUES, supranote 225, at 320-22; Fox, supra note 49,

at 305.
As the United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations stated, the purpose
of the ICCPR is to guarantee "a broad spectrum of civil and political rights, rooted
in basic democratic values and freedoms, to all individuals within the territory or
under the jurisdiction of the States Party without distinction of any kind, such as
race, gender, ethnicity, et cetera."
Id. (quoting S. ExEc. REP. No. 102-23, at 1 (1992)); see also Sloss, The Domestication of
InternationalHuman Rights, supra note 49, at 138 ("The ICCPR primarily imposes negative
obligations on states: It obligates parties to refrain from interfering in a protected sphere of personal
liberty.").
249. ICCPR, supra note 6, art. I ("By virtue of [the right of self-determination, all peoples]
freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural
development.").
250. See id. art. 3 (equal right of men and women to the enjoyment of all rights in the treaty).
251. Id. art. 6, para. 1.
252. Id. art. 17.
253. Id. arts. 18, 19, para. 2.
254. ICCPR, supra note 6, arts. 21, 22, para. 2.
255. Id. art. 7.
256. Id. art. 8, para. 2.
257. Id. art. 7.
258. Id. art. 2, para. 3(a)-(c); see Sloss, The Domesticationof InternationalHuman Rights,
supra note 49, 142-43.
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established the Human Rights Committee to monitor parties' compliance
with the treaty and to receive reports on measures taken to implement it.259
The First Optional Protocol to the ICCPR has been in force since
1976,260 and gives the Human Rights Committee authority to consider
communications from individuals concerning alleged violations of the
treaty. 261 There currently are 104 parties to the First Optional Protocol; the
United States has not yet ratified it.262 The Second Optional Protocol has
been in force since 1991,263 and prohibits the death penalty. 264 There
currently are 52 parties265to the Second Optional Protocol; the United States
has not yet ratified it.
C. InternationalCovenant on Economic, Social and CulturalRights
The ICESCR has been in force since 1976, and currently has 148
parties. 2' The United States signed the ICESCR in 1977, but has not yet
268
ratified it,267 and seemingly has no intention of ratifying it in the future.
But under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Vienna
Convention), the United States, while not bound by the terms of the
ICESCR, must
refrain from acts that would defeat the object and purpose
269
of the treaty.
259. ICCPR, supra note 6, art. 28; see BUERGENTHAL, supranote 28, at 43-48; CARTER ETAL.,
supra note 30, at 774. See generally Torkel Opsahl, The Human Rights Committee, in THE UNITED
NATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL, supra note 203, at 369-443.

260. U.N. Web Site, supra note 210.
261. First Optional Protocol, supra note 223, art. 1; see BUERGENTHAI, supra note 28, at 4850; CARTER ET AL., supra note 30, at 774. On the necessity of the right of individual petition, see
generally Rodley, On the Necessity of UnitedStates Ratificationof the InternationalHuman Rights
Conventions, in U.S. RATIFICATION OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES: WITH OR WITHOUT
RESERVATIONS?, supra note 86.

262. U.N. Web Site, supra note 210.
263. Id.
264. Second Optional Protocol, supranote 223, art. 1; see BUERGENTHAL, supra note 28, at
50-51.
265. U.N. Web Site, supra note 210.
266. For a list ofthe participants, their dates ofsignature and ratification, any reservations, and
any territorial applications, see id.
267. Id.
268. Van der Vyver, supranote 48, at 778.
269. Vienna Convention, supra note 30, art. 18. Ironically, the United States also has failed
to ratify the Vienna Convention. U.N. Web Site, supranote 210. However, it is generally agreed
that the provisions of the Vienna Convention are nevertheless binding as customary international
law. See Herbert W. Briggs, United States Ratification ofthe Vienna Treaty Convention, 73 AM.
J. INT'L L. 470, 471 (1979); Maria Frankowska, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
Before United States Courts, 28 VA. J. INT'L L. 281, 286 (1988) (noting that the United States
recognizes the Vienna Convention as the "authoritative guide to current treaty law and practice");
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The ICESCR, like the ICCPR, contains a broad list of rights,2 7 ° but is
phrased in more gradual terms than the ICCPR. 27 ' The rights provided
include: a right of self-determination;2 2 a right to work in just and
favorable conditions 273 and to form trade unions;2 4 a right to social
insurance; 275 a right to an adequate standard of living;2 a right to
education; 7 and a right to take part in cultural life. 278 The ECOSOC is
responsible for monitoring compliance with the ICESCR,279 and
established the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights as a
parallel to the Human Rights Committee. 8 °

Daniel N. Hylton, Note, Default Breakdown: The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties:
InadequateFrameworkon Reservations, 27 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 419,421 (1994) (stating that
the Vienna Convention "codified customary international law on the subject, and the international
community accepts most of the Convention as the authoritative codification of contemporary
international treaty law").
270. See generally BUERGENTHAL, supra note 28, at 52-53; Greenberg, Race, Sex, and
Religious Discriminationin InternationalLaw, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: LEGAL
AND POLICY ISSUES, supranote 225, at 319-20; David M. Trubek, Economic, Social, and Cultural
Rights in the Third World: Human Rights Law andHuman Needs Programs,in HUMAN RIGHTS IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW:LEGAL AND POLICY ISSUES, supranote 225, at 210-23.
271. BUERGENTHA, supra note 28, at 53-55; CARTERET AL., supra note 30, at 774.
Each State Party to the [ICESCR] undertakes to take steps, individually and
through international assistance and co-operation, especially economic and
technical, to the maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving
progressively the full realizationof the rights recognized in the [ICESCR] by all
appropriate means, including particularly the adoption of legislative measures.
ICESCR, supra note 7, art. 2(1) (emphasis added). But see BUERGENTHAL, supranote 28, at 55-56
(noting that the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights requires that although the full
realization of rights may be achieved progressively, steps toward that goal must be taken within a
reasonably short time after the ICESCR's entry into force).
272. ICESCR, supra note 7, art. 1.
273. Id. arts. 6, 7.
274. Id. art. 8.
275. Id. art. 9.
276. Id. art. 11.
277. ICESCR, supra note 7, art. 13.
278. Id. art. 15.
279. Id. arts. 16-22.
280. See generally Philip Alston, The Committee on Economic, Social and CulturalRights,
in THE UNITEDNATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: A CRITICALAPPRAISAL, supranote 203, at 473-508;
BUERGENTHAL, supra note 28, at 56-57.
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D. Convention on the Preventionand Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide
The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (Genocide Convention)28 ' has been in force since 1951 and
currently has 135 parties.282 The United States ratified the Genocide
Convention in 1988.283 However, the ratification was subject to several
reservations, understandings, and declarations, including a nonselfexecution declaration. 284 But Congress has enacted implementing
legislation for the Genocide Convention.285
The Genocide Convention provides that "genocide, whether committed
in time of peace or in time of war, is a crime under international law. 286
The parties undertake to prevent and to punish the crime of genocide,287 as
well as conspiracy, incitement, attempt, or complicity to commit
genocide. 288 The treaty defines genocide as any of the following acts
committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical,
racial, or religious group: killing members of the group; causing serious
bodily or mental harm to members of the group; deliberately inflicting
conditions of life calculated to bring about physical destruction of

281. Genocide Convention, supra note 8. See generally BUERGENTHAL, supranote 28, at 5861; CARTER ET AL., supranote 30, at 780-81.
282. For a list of the participants, their dates of signature and ratification, any reservations, and
any territorial applications, see U.N. Web Site, supra note 210.
283. Id.
284. U.S. RUDs to Genocide Convention, supra note 183. "The Senate's advice and consent
is subject to the following declaration: That the President will not deposit the instrument of
ratification until after the implementing legislation referred to in Article V has been enacted." Id.
III. Although this declaration is not in the classic form of a nonself-execution declaration, it is
considered the functional equivalent of one. Damrosch, supra note 48, at 522. Further, the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, in its report on the treaty, expressed the view that the Genocide
Convention would be nonself-executing. Id.(citing S. ExEc. REP. No. 2 (1985), reprintedin 80
AM. J.INT'L L. 612, 621 (1986)).
285. The legislation defines genocide as a federal crime and establishes the applicable criminal
penalties. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1091-1093 (1988). However, it expresses an intention to confine the
domestic legal effect of the Genocide Convention to such criminal proceedings as may be brought
pursuant to it and purports to preclude reliance on the Genocide Convention as a source of civilly
enforceable rights. Damrosch, supra note 48, at 522-23 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1093).
286. Genocide Convention, supranote 8, art. I; see id. art. IV; BUERGENTHAL, supra note 28,
at 58-59 ("A 'crime under international law' is a grave offense against the law of nations for which
the individual perpetrator is punishable. It is different from a mere violation of international law,
which makes a government liable for the resulting damages without imposing criminal
responsibility on individuals.").
287. Genocide Convention, supra note 8, art. I.
288. Id.art. III.
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members of the group; imposing measures intended to prevent births
within the
group; or forcibly transferring children of the group to another
89
2

group.

E. InternationalConvention on the Elimination ofAll Forms of
RacialDiscrimination
The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination (CERD)2 9° has been in force since 1969 and currently has
169 parties. 29' The United States ratified the CERD in 1994.292 However,
the ratification was subject to several reservations, understandings, and
declarations, including a nonself-execution declaration.293
The CERD obligates parties "to prohibit and to eliminate racial
discrimination in all its forms and to guarantee the right of everyone,
without distinction as to race, colour, or national or ethnic origin, to
equality before the law." 294 The treaty defines racial discrimination as "any
distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, colour,
descent or national or ethnic origin which has the purpose or effect of
nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal
footing, of human rights and fundamental freedoms., 295 The treaty

289. Id. art. II; see BUERGENTHAL, supranote 28, at 59 (noting that the Genocide Convention
requires the specific intent to destroy a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group).
290. CERD, supra note 9. See generally BUERGENTHAL, supranote 28, at 61-69; CARTER ET
AL.,supra note 30, at 781.

291. For a list of the participants, their dates of signature and ratification, any reservations, and
any territorial applications, see U.N. Web Site, supra note 210. For a critique of the treaty, see
MERON, supra note 203, at 7-52.
292. U.N. Web Site, supra note 210.
293. U.S. RUDs to CERD, supra note 189. "The Senate's advice and consent is subject to the
following declaration: That the United States declares that the provisions of the Convention are not
self-executing." Id. III.
294. CERD, supra note 9, art. 5; see id.art. 2(1 )(d); Sloss, The Domesticationoflnternational
Human Rights, supra note 49, at 139-40 (noting that the CERD prohibits racial discrimination by
government entities, but also obligates governments to take affirmative steps to eliminate
discrimination by private groups). For other related obligations, see generally BUERGENTHAL, supra
note 28, at 62-63; Greenberg, Race, Sex, and Religious Discriminationin InternationalLaw, in
HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: LEGAL AND POLICY ISSUES, supra note 225, at 322-25.
295. CERD, supra note 9, art. l(1); see BUERGENTHAL, supra note 28, at 61-62 (noting that
the International Court of Justice has accepted this definition of racial discrimination as an
authoritative interpretation of the nondiscrimination clause of the U.N. Charter).
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establishes the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination to
monitor compliance.296
F. Convention on the EliminationofAll Forms of Discrimination
Against Women
The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women (CEDAW)2 97 has been in force since 1981 and currently
has 175 parties.2 98 The United States signed the treaty in 1980, but has not
yet ratified it.29 The CEDAW has been "on hold" for over twenty years,
with no apparent prospect of ratification within the foreseeable future."'
But under the Vienna Convention, the United States must refrain from acts
that would defeat the object and purpose of the treaty.3 '
The CEDAW requires parties to grant equal rights to women, to take
appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women, and to
ensure the full development and advancement of women,30 2 in a variety of
areas, particularly the political, social, economic, and cultural fields.30 3 The
treaty defines discrimination against women as "any distinction, exclusion
or restriction made on the basis of sex which has the effect or purpose of
impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by women,
irrespective of their marital status, on a basis of equality of men and
women, of human rights and fundamental freedoms."" The treaty
establishes the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against
Women to monitor compliance with its provisions.3 5

296. CERD, supra note 9, arts. 8-19. See generally BUERGENTHAL, supra note 28, at 63-66;
Karl Josef Partsch, The Committee on the Elimination ofRacial Discrimination, in THE UNITED
NATIONS AND HuMAN RIGHTS: A CRTICAL APPRAISAL, supra note 203, at 339-68.
297. CEDAW, supra note 10. See generally BUERGENTHAL, supranote 28, at 68-72; CARTER
ET AL., supranote 30, at 781.
298. For a list of the participants, their dates of signature and ratification, any reservations, and
any territorial applications, see U.N. Web Site, supra note 210. For a critique of the treaty, see
MERON, supra note 203, at 53-82.
299. U.N. Web Site, supra note 210.
300. Van der Vyver, supra note 48, at 779.
301. See supra note 269.
302. CEDAW, supra note 10, arts. 2, 3.
303. Id.arts. 3-16. But see BUERGENTHAL, supra note 28, at 70 (explaining that the
effectiveness of the CEDAW has been significantly undermined by many nations' reservations).
304. CEDAW, supra note 10, art. 1.
305. Id.arts. 17-22. See generally BUERGENTHAL, supra note 28, at 71-72; Roberta Jacobson,
The Committee on the Elimination ofDiscrimination Against Women, in THE UNITEDNATIONS AND
HUMAN RIGHTS: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL, supra note 203, at 444-72.
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G. ConventionAgainst Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or
DegradingTreatment or Punishment
The Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT) 3 6 has been in force since 1987
and currently has 135 parties.30 7 The United States ratified the CAT in
1994,308 but the ratification was subject to several reservations,
declarations, and understandings, including a nonself-execution
declaration.30 9 The United States has enacted some, but not all, of the
necessary implementing legislation for the CAT. 1
The CAT provides that the parties "shall take effective legislative,
administrative, judicial or other measures to prevent acts of torture in any
' The treaty also provides that "[n]o
territory under its jurisdiction."311
exceptional circumstances whatsoever . . . may be invoked as a

justification of torture. 3 12 Parties must prosecute or extradite individuals
who are alleged to have committed torture within their jurisdiction3 1 3 and

306. CAT, supranote 11. See generally BUERGENTHAL, supra note 28, at 72-76; CARTER ET
AL., supra note 30, at 781.
307. For a list ofthe participants, their dates ofsignature and ratification, any reservations, and
any territorial applications, see U.N. Web Site, supra note 210.
308. Id.
309. U.S. RUDs to CAT, supranote 171. "The Senate's advice and consent is subject to the
following declarations: (1) That the United States declare that the provisions of Articles 1 through
16 of the Convention are not self-executing." Id. III(1).
310. See In re Atuar, 2003 WL 23207823, at * 12 (S.D.W. Va. 2003) (finding that obligations
under article 15 have not been implemented legislatively); CARTER ET AL., supra note 30, at 807
n.2.
311. CAT, supra note 11, art. 2(1). "Torture" is defined as
any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is
intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a
third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third
person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or
coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any
kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the
consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official
capacity.
Id. art. 1(1). See Sloss, The Domesticationof InternationalHuman Rights, supra note 49, at 139
("The [CAT] primarily imposes affirmative obligations on state parties, rather than negative
obligations. The [CAT] requires governments to ensure that persons who commit acts of torture are
subjected to criminal penalties.... Thus, many of the [CAT's] provisions are not intended to create
rights for individuals.").
312. CAT, supra note 11, art. 2(2).
313. Id. art. 7(1).
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shall not extradite a person to another nation where there are substantial
grounds to believe that he would be subjected to torture.31 4 The CAT
establishes
the Committee against Torture to monitor compliance with the
3 15
treaty.
H. Convention on the Rights of the Child
The Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) has been in force
since 1990316 and currently has 192 parties. 317 The United States signed the
CRC in 1995, but has not yet ratified it.318 "There are no indications that
the United States intends to ratify the CRC .... But under the Vienna
Convention, the United States must refrain from acts that would defeat the
object and purpose of the treaty.3 19
The CRC sets forth a variety of rights for children, relating to, among
320
other things, freedom of thought, conscience, expression, and religion;
access to information; 321 standard of living; 322 and education. 323 The treaty
defines "child" as anyone under the age of eighteen. 24 The treaty
establishes the Committee on the Rights of the Child to monitor
compliance with its terms.325

314. Id. art. 3(1).
315. Id. arts. 17-23. See generally BUERGENTHAL, supra note 28, at 74-76; Andrew Byrnes,
The Committee Against Torture, in THE UNITED NATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: A CRITIcAL

APPRAISAL, supra note 203, at 509-46.
316. CRC, supra note 12. See generally BUERGENTHAL, supra note 28, at 76-78; CARTER ET
AL., supra note 30, at 782.
317. For a list of the participants, their dates of signature and ratification, any reservations, and
any territorial applications, see U.N. Web Site, supra note 210.
318. The CRC has been ratified by all but two countries of the world: Somalia, which since
1992 has had no government that could ratify it, and the United States. Van der Vyver, supranote
48, at 778.
319. See supratext accompanying note 269.
320. CRC, supra note 12, arts. 13, 14.
321. Id.art. 17.
322. Id.art. 27.
323. Id.art. 29.
324. Id.art. 1.
325. CRC, supra note 12, art. 43; see BUERGENTHAL, supra note 28, at 78.
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There are two Optional Protocols to the CRC.3 26 The first prohibits the
use of children in armed conflict; 327 the second prohibits the sale of
children, child prostitution, and child pornography.3 28 The Optional
Protocols currently have 70 and 71 parties respectively, both including the
United States.329
V. CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF NONSELF-EXECUTION DECLARATIONS

Section A introduces the major problem of nonself-execution
declarations: they accomplish the same effects that the Bricker Amendment
sought to implement.33 ° Section B discusses the major arguments made by
the treaty-makers in support of nonself-execution declarations.331 Section
C examines the treatment of nonself-execution declarations in U.S.
courts.332 Section D presents several constitutional arguments against
nonself-execution declarations.333 Section E discusses the policy arguments
against nonself-execution declarations.334
A. Introduction
Although the Bricker Amendment failed,335 the treaty-makers have
implemented the same policy the amendment sought to impose, by
attaching nonself-execution declarations to every human rights treaty the
United States has ratified.336 Nonself-execution declarations purport
unilaterally to declare, regardless of other interpretations, that a particular

326. Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of
Children in Armed Conflict, G.A. Res. 54/263, U.N. GAOR, 54t' Sess., Annex I, Supp. No. 49, at
7, U.N. Doc. A/54/49 (2000) [hereinafter Armed Conflict Protocol]; Optional Protocol to the
Convention on the Rights o the Child on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child
Pornography, G.A. Res. 54/263, U.N. GAOR, 54t' Sess., Supp. No. 49, Annex II, at 6, U.N. Doc.
A/54/49 (2000) [hereinafter Sale, Prostitution, and Pornography Protocol].
327. Armed Conflict Protocol, supra note 326; see CARTER ET AL., supra note 30, at 782.
328. Sale, Prostitution, and Pornography Protocol, supranote 326; see CARTER ET AL., supra
note 30, at 782.
329. U.N. Web Site, supranote 210.
330. See infra text accompanying notes 335-42.
331. See infra text accompanying notes 343-61.
332. See infra text accompanying notes 362-73.
333. See infra text accompanying notes 374-417.
334. See infra text accompanying notes 418-45.
335. See supra text accompanying notes 118-20.
336. See KAUFMAN, supranote 73, at 172; supra text accompanying notes 246, 284, 293, &
309.
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treaty is nonself-executing. 3 7 By declaring human rights treaties to be
nonself-executing, the United States achieves what Senator Bricker sought
to require by constitutional amendment. 38
"One purpose of the Bricker Amendment was to remove the issue [of
international human rights] permanently from U.S. court jurisdiction, by
'
requiring that all treaties be deemed nonself-executing. 339
Nonselfexecution declarations effectively accomplish that purpose: they eliminate
the discretion of the courts to determine whether specific provisions are
self-executing and foreclose the courts' jurisdiction to hear claims based
on human rights treaties.34 ° Another purpose of the Bricker Amendment
was to ensure that all changes in domestic protection of human rights
would be made by legislation, involving the House of Representatives.341
Nonself-execution declarations also accomplish this purpose: they are

337. See KAUFMAN, supranote 73, at 172; Damrosch, supranote 48, at 516-17 ("[Tlhe Senate
has attempted to switch self-executing treaty provisions into the nonself-executing category. That
is, if the courts on their own would treat certain provisions as self-executing in the absence of any
contrary indication from the "treaty-makers," the presence of such a declaration purports to reverse
that outcome."); see also Sloss, The Domesticationof InternationalHumanRights, supranote 49,
at 156-57.
338. Henkin, supra note 104, at 349.
Senator Bricker lost his battle, but his ghost is enjoying victory in war. For the
package of reservations, understandings and declarations achieves virtually what
the Bricker Amendment sought, and more.... By its package of RUDs, the United
States effectively fulfill[s] Senator Bricker's purpose, leaving [human rights
treaties] without any life in United States law: The policy of declaring human
rights conventions non-self-executing achieves what Senator Bricker sought to do
by constitutional amendment.
Id.
339. See KAUFMAN, supra note 73, at 172; supratext accompanying notes 105-08.
340. See KAUFMAN, supra note 73, at 172; Bums H. Weston, U.S. Ratification of the
InternationalCovenanton Economic, Socialand CulturalRights: With or Without Qualifications,
in U.S. RATIFICATION OF THE HuMAN RIGHTS TREATIES: WITH OR WITHOUT RESERVATIONS?, supra

note 86, at 37; Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 32, at 419; Damrosch, supra note 48, at 517 ("the
Senate has acted out of an explicit or implicit motivation to preclude the courts from using the
treaty as a source of law, even though the treaty by its nature or its terms would otherwise lend itself
to direct judicial application"); Stewart, supra note 86, at 79 ("What the declaration makes clear
is that the Executive Branch, acting in conjunction with the Federal legislature, will oversee
domestic implementation of the Covenant, rather than the federal or state judiciaries."); supratext
accompanying notes 190-97.
341. See supratext accompanying notes 105-08.
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"esigned to assure that changes in U.S. [domestic] law will be effected
' 342
only by 'democratic processes' ... by legislation, not by treaty."
B. Supportfor Nonself-Execution Declarations
The treaty-makers have given several justifications for nonselfexecution declarations. 343 First, the treaty-makers believe that, taking into
account the substantive reservations and interpretive conditions also
attached to human rights treaties, U.S. domestic laws and remedies are
sufficient to meet U.S. obligations under those treaties. 3 " Thus, they see
345
no additional need for domestic implementation of the treaties' terms.
As a related matter, the treaty-makers are probably motivated by a

342. See Weston, U.S. Ratification of the InternationalCovenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights: With or Without Qualifications,in U.S. RATIFICATION OF THE HuMAN RIGHTS
TREATIES: WITH OR WITHOUT RESERVATIONS?, supra note 86, at 37-38; Bradley, supranote 32,
at 1592-93; Damrosch, supra note 48, at 517-18; Henkin, supranote 104, at 346; Stewart, supra
note 86, at 79.
To a lesser but nonetheless important extent, the declaration also reflected a strong
preference not to use the unicameral treaty power under Article VI of the
Constitution to effect direct changes in the domestic law of the United States.
Where such changes are considered appropriate, they can and should be approved
by both Houses of the Congress and enacted by the President in the ordinary
legislative process.
Stewart, supra note 86, at 79.
The U.S. treatymakers are also increasingly using the non-self-execution approach
to ensure that international obligations are filtered through the U.S. legislative
process before they change U.S. domestic law .... Among other things, these
declarations ensure that interpretations of the treaties by international institutions
established under the treaties will not by themselves operate as U.S. domestic law.
Bradley, supra note 47, at 1592-93.
343. See Bradley & Goldsmith, supranote 32, at 420; infra text accompanying notes 344-61.
344. Bradley & Goldsmith, supranote 32, at 420-21 (citing International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms ofRacial Discrimination, S. ExEc. REP. No. 103-29, at 6-7,33-34 (1994);
Report of the Committee on Foreign Relations, International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, S. EXEC. REP. No. 102-23, at 10 (1992); Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, S. EXEC. REP. No. 10 1-30, at 12 (1990); Report
of the Committee on Foreign Relations, International Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, S. ExEC. REP. No. 99-2, at 15 (1985)); see Stewart, supra
note 86, at 79; Fox, supranote 49, at 310-11; Kuhner, supra note 30, at 426-27.
345. Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 32, at 421-22.
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"justifiable pride in indigenous sources of U.S. law" and see human rights
treaties as a threat to the Constitution and domestic legislation.346
Second, the treaty-makers often are concerned that certain treaty terms,
although similar in substance to U.S. law, are not identical in wording.347
Were those provisions deemed self-executing, they would have a
destabilizing effect on domestic rights protections.34 Furthermore, a
substantial amount of litigation would result if human rights treaties
applied directly as U.S. law.349 Therefore, nonself-execution declarations
permanently remove human rights treaties from the jurisdiction of U.S.
courts, 350 and prevent the treaties from creating private rights enforceable
" ' They make clear that the federal executive and legislative
in U.S. courts.35
branches will oversee domestic implementation of human rights treaties,
rather than federal and state judiciaries. 2

346. Fox, supra note 49, at 310 (citing Damrosch, supra note 48, at 517-18; Henkin, supra
note 104, at 341; van der Vyver, supra note 48, at 780).
347. Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 32, at 421 (citing Four Treaties Relating to Human
Rights, Hearingsbefore Comm. on ForeignRelations,96th Cong. 54-55 (1979) (State Department
memorandum) ("The Covenants and U.S. statutes, while embodying almost identical rights, are not
identical in wording. The purpose of the non-self-executing declaration, therefore, is to prevent the
subjection of fundamental rights to differing and possibly confusing standards of protection in our
courts.")).
348. Id.
349. Id.; see Rovine & Goldklang, Defense of Declarations, Reservations, and
Understandings, in U.S. RATIFICATION OF THE HuMAN RIGHTS TREATIES: WITH OR WITHOUT

RESERVATIONS?, supra note 86, at 64; Stewart, supra note 86, at 79.
If these treaties were to become laws of the U.S. directly enforceable in the courts,
i.e., self-executing treaties, then we would have a legal nightmare. First, we would
have our state laws, local laws, and federal laws. Second, the courts would have
to try to interpret how this other body of long and complicated treaties fits in. If
the treaties were law in our own courts, we would have to be twice as careful in
drafting understandings and declarations and in clearing up ambiguities.
Rovine & Goldklang, Defense of Declarations, Reservations, and Understandings, in U.S.
RATIFICATION OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES: WITH OR WITHOUT RESERVATIONS?, supranote
86, at 64.
350. See Damrosch, supra note 48, at 531 ("the non-self-execution declaration purports to tell
courts not to apply a treaty in cases that could otherwise properly come before them"); supratext
accompanying notes 190-97 & 341.
351. See Stewart, supra note 86, at 79; Kuhner, supra note 30, at 426; supra text
accompanying notes 190-97 & 342-43.
352. Stewart, supra note 86, at 79; see id. ("The concern which gave rise to this declaration
was not over what the Constitution requires but whether to accord the judiciary the primary role in
supervising implementation of the [human rights treaties].").
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Third, the treaty-makers sometimes disagree about which treaty terms,
if any, would be deemed self-executing by U.S. courts.353 Nonselfexecution declarations are intended to provide certainty about this issue in
advance of litigation by removing the issue from consideration.354
Finally, and most importantly, the treaty-makers believe that if there is
to be a change in the scope of domestic rights protections, it should be
made by legislation with the participation of the House of
Representatives. 3 5 Three reasons are commonly cited to insist on the
participation of the House of Representatives in the implementation of
human rights treaties. First, "the House has a constitutionally mandated
role with respect to the subject matter of those treaties. 356 Second, the
involvement of the House is politically necessary. 35 7 Third, since treaties

prevail over prior inconsistent statues, 358 the House should be involved in
overruling laws it has lawfully enacted.359

353. Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 32, at 421; see Weissbrodt, supra note 48, at 70-71;
supra text accompanying notes 50-57. Compare, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 6, art. 2(2), and Four
TreatiesRelation to Human Rights, Hearingsbefore Comm. on ForeignRelations,96th Cong. 415
(1979) (memorandum of Robert Owens, Legal Adviser to the State Department), with, e.g., Four
TreatiesRelationto HumanRights, Hearingsbefore Comm. on ForeignRelations,96th Cong. 27677 (1979) (statement of Oscar Schachter), andFourTreatiesRelation to Human Rights, Hearings
before Comm. on ForeignRelations, 96th Cong. 287-88 (1979) (statement of Louis Henkin), and
Rovine & Goldklang, Defense of Declarations, Reservations, and Understandings, in U.S.
RATIFICATION OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS TREATES: WITH OR WITHOUT RESERVATIONS?, supra note
86, at 65 ("When these treaties were drafted, they were written so they would not be self-executing.
They include statements that parties shall undertake to enact legislation to do certain things.").
354. Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 32, at 421.
355. Id.; see Henkin, supra note 104, at 346 ("The non-self-executing declaration has been
explained - and justified - as designed to assure that changes in U.S. law will be effected only
by "democratic processes" - therefore, by legislation, not by treaty."); Stewart, supra note 86, at
79; supra text accompanying notes 31-32.
[Nonself-execution declarations reflect] a strong preference not to use the
unicameral treaty power under Article VI of the Constitution to effect direct
changes in the domestic law of the United States. Where such changes are
considered appropriate, they can and should be approved by both Houses of the
Congress and enacted by the President in the ordinary legislative process.
Stewart, supra note 86, at 79.
356. See Damrosch, supra note 48, at 528.
357. See id. at 528-29.
358. See supra text accompanying notes 42-46.
359. See Damrosch, supra note 48, at 529-30.
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The over-arching justification advanced by the treaty-makers is that
nonself-execution declarations do not impair U.S. treaty compliance,3 6 ° but
rather simply leave the implementation of treaty terms to the appropriate
domestic authorities.36 '
C. Nonself-Execution Declarationsin U.S. Courts
U.S. courts generally enforce nonself-execution declarations - by
considering the human rights treaties to which the declarations are attached
to be nonself-executing - without considering their validity in any
detail. 362 Courts have construed the nonself-execution declarations as not
only precluding private causes of action based on human rights treaties, but
as precluding any judicial enforcement of the treaties.3 63 However, some
commentators suggest that there may be some cases in which courts should
disregard nonself-execution declarations and reach the merits of treatybased human rights claims.
36536
In Beazley
Johnson,
a case
illustrative
of many
others,36to6 Petitioner
sought
federalv.habeas
corpus
relief
after being
sentenced
death for

360. See id. at 515; see also Rovine & Goldklang, Defense ofDeclarations,Reservations,and
Understandings, in U.S. RATIFICATION OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES: WITH OR WITHouT
RESERVATIONS?, supranote 86, at 64 ("We have the same obligation whether the treaties are self-

executing or not. We have an internationalobligation to have the proper laws and to live up to what
we promised in these treaties."); Stewart, supra note 86, at 79 ("[T]his declaration does not affect
or circumscribe the international obligations of the U.S. under the [human rights treaties.]").
361. Damrosch, supranote 48, at 515; see Stewart, supranote 86, at 79; see also supratext
accompanying notes 351-53, & 356-60.
362. Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 32, at 402 (citing Igartua De la Rosa v. United States,
32 F.3d 8, 10 n.1 (1st Cir. 1994); Sandhu v. Burke, No. 97 Civ. 4608 (JGK), 2000 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 3584, at *32 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 10, 2000); Ralkv. Lincoln County, 81 F. Supp. 2d 1372, 1380
(S.D. Ga. 2000); Calderon v. Reno, 39 F. Supp. 2d 943, 956 (N.D. Ill. 1998); Jama v. INS, 22 F.
Supp. 2d 353, 362 (D.N.J. 1998); White v. Paulsen, 997 F. Supp. 1380, 1387 (E.D. Wash. 1998);
In re Cheung, 968 F. Supp. 791, 803 n. 17 (D. Conn. 1997); Domingues v. Nevada, 961 P.2d 1279,
1280 (Nev. 1998)); see infra text accompanying notes 363-73.
363. See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 32, at 422; see also Sloss, The Domesticationof
InternationalHuman Rights, supra note 49, at 197-203 (summarizing several judicial decisions in
which litigants have raised claims under human rights treaties).
364. See, e.g., Sloss, TheDomesticationoflnternationalHumanRights, supranote 49, at 20319 (proposing a five-part decision-making model for judges to apply in determining whether to
address the merits of such claims: (1) Is it a frivolous claim?; (2) Is relief available under some
other provision of U.S. law?; (3) Is there an alternative forum available?; (4) Is the treaty being
invoked as a defense to a civil or criminal action?; and (5) Is the plaintiff relying on the treaty to
establish a private cause of action?).
365. 242 F.3d 248 (5th Cir. 2001).
366. See supra text accompanying note 363 and cases cited.
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capital murder.367 Petitioner, who was seventeen years old at the time of the
murder, argued that Article 6(5) of the ICCPR invalidated his death
sentence.368 Petitioner asserted that the U.S. nonself-execution declaration
to articles 1 through 27 was invalid.369 Specifically, Petitioner argued that
the nonself-execution declaration was invalidated by article 50 of the
ICCPR, which states, "[t]he provisions of the present Covenant shall
extend to all parts of federal States without any limitations or
exceptions. 37 °
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit disagreed, and held that
the declaration was valid, and prevented any enforcement of Article 6(5).371
According to the Court, Petitioner's "claim that the Senate, in ratifying the
treaty, voided its own attached declaration [was] nonsensical, to say the
very least. 3 72 The Court agreed with many other courts that have found the
Senate's intent clear that the ICCPR be nonself-executing.373
D. ConstitutionalArguments Against Nonself-Execution Declarations
The practice of attaching nonself-execution declarations to human
374
rights treaties "threatens to subvert the constitutional treaty system.,
First, the practice violates the spirit - and maybe the letter - of the
Supremacy Clause.375 Second, it delegates to the House of Representatives

367. See Beazley, 242 F.3d at 253-55.
368. See id. at 264. Article 6(5) provides in pertinent part, "[s]entence of death shall not be
imposed for crimes committed by persons below eighteen years of age." ICCPR, supranote 6, art.
6(5).
369. See U.S. RUDs to ICCPR, supra note 170, 111(1); Beazley, 242 F.3d at 267; supratext
accompanying note 246.
370. ICCPR, supra note 6, art. 50; see Beazley, 242 F.3d at 267.
371. See Beazley, 242 F.3d at 267-68 ("The [declaration] is an express exception to article 50;
restated, article 50 does not void the Senate's express intent.").
372. Id. at 267.
373. Id. (citing United States v. Duarte-Acero, 208 F.3d 1282, 1285 (1 Ith Cir. 2000); Igartua
De La Rosa v. United States, 32 F.3d 8, 10 n. 1 (1st Cir. 1994); Ralk v. Lincoln County, 81 F. Supp.
2d 1372, 1380 (S.D. Ga. 2000); Jama v. INS, 22 F. Supp. 2d 353, 365 (D.N.J. 1998); White v.
Paulsen, 997 F. Supp. 1380, 1387 (E.D. Wash. 1998)); see also Poindexter v. Nash, 333 F.3d 372,
379 (2d Cir. 2003); Wesson v. U.S. Penitentiary, 305 F.3d 343, 348 (5th Cir. 2002) (per curiam);
Hain v. Gibson, 287 F.3d 1224, 1243 (10th Cir. 2002); Buell v. Mitchell, 274 F.3d 337, 371-72
(6th Cir. 2001); United States v. Thompson, 928 F.2d 1060, 1066 (11 th Cir. 1991); United States
v. Green, 671 F.2d 46, 50 (1st Cir. 1982); In re Cheung, 968 F. Supp. 791, 803 n.17 (D. Conn.
1997); cf.Ogbudimkpa v. Ashcroft, 342 F.3d 207, 211-12 (3d Cir. 2003) (applying the nonselfexecution declaration to the CAT); In re Atuar, 2003 WL 23207823, at *11 (S.D.W. Va. 2003)
(holding that the nonself-execution declaration to the CAT was valid).
374. Henkin, supra note 104, at 348.
375. See infra text accompanying notes 380-83.
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a role in treaty-making that it is denied under the U.S. Constitution.3 76
Third, the practice limits judicial review and implementation of human
rights treaties.3 77 Finally, it may go beyond the scope of the treaty power
given to the President and the Senate by the U.S. Constitution. 78 The
practice, if not unconstitutional, is at the very least "anticonstitutional. 379
1. The Supremacy Clause
The Supremacy Clause states, "all Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law
of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby., 380 This
language seems to mandate that human rights treaties have the status of
self-executing federal law, regardless of the wishes of the treaty-makers. 3 '
More fundamentally, the Supremacy Clause expressly provides for federal
lawmaking by treaty and does not mention legislative implementation.382
Nothing in the U.S. Constitution or in its history suggests that the Framers
contemplated that some treaties might not be self-executing; there certainly
is no evidence of any intent to allow the President or the Senate to prevent
a treaty
that by its character could be "law of the land" from becoming
83
SO.

3

376.
377.
378.
379.
380.
381.

See infra text accompanying notes 384-401.
See infra text accompanying notes 402-12.
See infra text accompanying notes 413-17.
See Henkin, supra note 104, at 349.
U.S. CONST. art. VI.
Henkin, supra note 104, at 346-47.
[A]s a general practice [a nonself-execution declaration] is against the spirit of the
Constitution; it may be unconstitutional. Article VI of the Constitution provides
expressly for lawmaking by treaty: treaties are declared to be the supreme law of
the land. The Framers intended that a treaty should become law ipsofacto,when
the treaty is made; it should not require legislative implementation to convert it
into United States law. In effect, lawmaking by treaty was to be an alternative to
legislation by Congress.

Id. at 346.
382. See U.S. CONST. art. VI; Henkin, supra note 104, at 346; supra text accompanying note
381.
383. Henkin, supranote 104, at 346-47.
Nothing in the Constitution or in the history of its adoption suggests that the
Framers contemplated that some treaties might not be law of the land. That was a
later suggestion by John Marshall, because he found that some promises by their
character could not be "self-executing": when the United States undertook to do
something in the future that could be done only by legislative or other political act,
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2. Separation of Powers
a. Delegation to the House of Representatives
The treaty-makers believe that if there is to be a change in the scope of
domestic rights protections, then it should be made by legislation with the
participation of the House of Representatives.38 4 The reasons cited to insist
on participation of the House of Representatives in the implementation of
human rights treaties are: that the House has a constitutionally mandated
role with respect to the subject matter of those treaties, that the
involvement of the House is politically necessary and that since treaties
prevail over prior inconsistent statues, the House should be involved in
overruling laws it has lawfully enacted.38
By requiring domestic legislation to implement human rights treaty
provisions, the treaty-makers are essentially delegating to the House of
Representatives a power that it does not have under the U.S.
Constitution.386 The House was denied a role in treaty-making by the
the treaty did not - could not - carry out the undertaking. Marshall did not
contemplate that treaty undertakings that could be given effect as law by the
Executive and the courts, or by the states, should not be carried out by then, but
might be converted into promises that Congress would legislate. Surely, there is
no evidence of any intent, by the Framers (or by John Marshall), to allow the
President or the Senate, by their ipse dixit, to prevent a treaty that by its character
could be law of the land from becoming law of the land.
Id. at 346-47 (citing Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (1 Pet.) 253, 253 (1829)). But see Bradley &
Goldsmith, supranote 32, at 446-49 (refuting this argument on the basis that the Supremacy Clause
was not designed to restrict the federal government's flexibility to determine whether and how to
comply with international law, but rather to enhance its ability to compel state compliance with
treaties).
384. See supra text accompanying notes 356-60.
385. See supra text accompanying notes 357-60.
386. Henkin, supra note 104, at 347.
That practice [of attaching nonself-execution declarations to human rights
treaties], in effect, gives the House of Representatives a role refused to it by the
Framers and rejected repeatedly over two hundred years when constitutional
amendments to that end were proposed (and failed). A proposed amendment in
1953 - the Bricker Amendment - which would have made all treaties nonselfexecuting, was not adopted.
Whatever might be said for amending the Constitution to require consent to a
treaty by both Houses of Congress, that is not what the Constitution (unamended)
provides. In any event, declaring a treaty - here a human rights convention achieves the worst ofboth systems. A human rights convention, like other treaties,
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Framers, and again when the Bricker Amendment failed.3 87 Requiring the
participation of the House in human rights treaties calls into question every
treaty made by the President and the Senate alone.388
Moreover, the reasons cited for insisting on the participation of the
House are neither constitutionally nor logically sound.389 The first
argument is that the House has a constitutionally mandated role with
respect to the subject matter of human rights treaties. 39It is clear that if the
House does have such a role with respect to a treaty's subject matter, a
nonself-execution declaration would be necessary and appropriate.39 ' But
the subject matter of human rights treaties is not one of the few subjects
that require the participation of the House.392 "There is no constitutional
requirement that the House act in parallel to the Senate with respect to
treaties that... strengthen judicial protection of human rights."3'93
The second argument is that the involvement of the House is politically
essential.394 But this motivation is questionable; the argument of deference
probably is nothing more than a guise under which a minority of Senators,
fundamentally opposed to human rights treaties, attempt to circumvent the

goes to the Senate for its consent, where - "undemocratically" - a third of the
members (plus one) can reject the convention. But unlike treaties generally, human
rights conventions would later, after Senate consent and U.S. ratification, require
going to the Senate again, as well as to the House, for implementing legislation,
involving additional, often extended delays and obstacles to carrying out United
States international obligations.
Id. at 347.
387. Id.; see supra text accompanying notes 31 & 119.
388. See Henkin, supranote 104, at 346.
The non-self-executing declaration has been explained - and justified - as
designed to assure that changes in U.S. law will be effected only by "democratic
processes" - therefore, by legislation, not by treaty. That argument, of course,
impugns the democratic character of every treaty made or that will be made by the
President with the consent of the Senate.
Id. at 346.
389. See infra text accompanying notes 390-401.
390. See supra text accompanying note 357.
391. See Damrosch, supra note 48, at 528.
392. See id.
at 528. Several areas are usually believed to require the participation ofthe House,
including the raising of revenue, the appropriation of funds, the enactment of criminal penalties,
and the declaration of war. Id. at 517.
393. Id.at 528.
394. See supra text accompanying note 358.
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already stringent supra-majority requirements for treaty approval.395
Nonself-execution declarations imposed for this reason merely delay and
create obstacles to the United States carrying out its international
obligations.3"
The third argument is that, since treaties prevail over prior inconsistent
statues, the House should be involved in overruling laws it has lawfully
enacted.3 97 Because of the last-in-time rule,3 98 the effect of adding a
nonself-execution declaration to an otherwise self-executing treaty is to
allow prior inconsistent statutory law to prevail, even though the treaty
would have superseded the statute in the absence of the declaration. 99
However, there is no justification for using a nonself-executing declaration
to preserve a prior inconsistent statute; the practice creates an indefensible
gap between domestic law and international obligation."' Any concerns
the treaty-makers have about the relationship of the treaty provisions to
statutory policy should be resolved before ratification.4 1
b. Limitation of Judicial Review
By attaching nonself-execution declarations to human rights treaties,
the treaty-makers have attempted to switch self-executing treaty provisions
into the nonself-executing category. 40 2 "That is, if the courts on their own

395. Damrosch, supranote 48, at 528-29.
396. Id. at 529 (quoting Louis HENKIN, CONSTITUTIONALISM, DEMOCRACY, AND FOREIGN
AFFAIRS 63 (1990); Louis Henkin, Treaties in a ConstitutionalDemocracy, 10 MICH. J. INT'L L.

406, 425 (1989)); see also id. ("If the treaty is of the sort that [courts would deem self-executing],
then why go through the superfluous action of adding House approval to the Senate's two-thirds
approval, which pursuant to Articles II and VI of the Constitution is constitutionally sufficient for
this purpose?"); Henkin, supranote 104, at 347.
A human rights convention, like other treaties, goes to the Senate for its consent,
where - "undemocratically" - a third of the members (plus one) can reject the
convention. But unlike treaties generally, human rights conventions would later,
after Senate consent and U.S. ratification, require going to the Senate again, as
well as to the House, for implementing legislation, involving additional, often
extended delays and obstacles to carrying out United States international
obligations.
Henkin, supra note 104, at 347.
397. See supra text accompanying notes 359-60.
398. See supra text accompanying notes 42-46.
399. Damrosch, supra note 48, at 531.
400. See id.
401. Id.
402. Id. at 516-17; see Weissbrodt, supra note 48, at 67; supra text accompanying note 338.
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would treaty certain provisions as self-executing in the absence of any
contrary indication from the 'treaty-makers,' 4 3 the presence of such a
declaration purports to reverse that outcome" and prevents the courts from
using human rights treaties as direct or indirect sources of law. 4" However,
the decision of whether a treaty is self-executing is more properly made by
the courts on the basis of previously articulated criteria.4 5
Article f1I of the U.S. Constitution establishes federal judicial
jurisdiction over treaty-based cases, 40 6 yet nonself-execution declarations
purport to tell courts not to apply certain treaties in cases over which they
would otherwise have jurisdiction.4 7 The Framers clearly contemplated
judicial enforcement of treaties and did not envision any role for the treatymakers in domestic treaty implementation."' Certainly they did not expect
the treaty-makers to stand in the way of the courts' performance of a
constitutionally-established function.40 9
In practice, it is likely anyway that courts would consider the Senate's
expression ofpreference as carrying great weight.4 10 But nonself-execution
declarations summarily deprive the courts of the opportunity to decide the

403. See supratext accompanying notes 50-57.
404. Damrosch, supranote 48, at 517; see Henkin, supranote 104, at 346 ("[T]he declaration
that a convention shall be non-self-executing is designed to keep [the United States'] own judges
from judging the human rights conditions in the United States by international standards.");
Weissbrodt, supra note 48, at 67-68.
405. See Damrosch, supra note 48, at 526; Weissbrodt, supra note 48, at 67 ("The effect of
[nonself-execution declarations] is to deprive American courts of their most potent technique for
contributing meaningfully to the interpretation of [human rights treaties].").
Whether or not a treaty is self-executing - and, therefore, to be treated as a law
without the need for legislative action - is initially a question for the President,
who is constitutionally obligated to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed." But, while the views of the Executive are given great weight, the issue
has been considered as ultimately one for the courts, which must determine
whether to give the treaty effect as law without legislative implementation.
Weissbrodt, supranote 48, at 67 (citing U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3; Lessee of Pollard's Heirs v. Kibbe,
39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 353,416 (1840); RESTATEMENT(SECOND) § 154; HENKlN,supra note 30, at 158).
406. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; see Damrosch, supra note 48, at 531.
407. Damrosch, supra note 48, at 531; see Weissbrodt, supra note 48, at 67-68; supra text
accompanying notes 403-05.
408. Damrosch, supranote 48, at 531; cf Fourteen Diamond Rings v. United States, 183 U.S.
176 (1901) (holding that the Senate cannot affect the courts' interpretation of a treaty after
ratification).
409. Damrosch, supranote 48, at 531.
410. In determining whether a treaty is self-executing, courts give great deference to the intent
of the parties. See id.at 526-27; supra text accompanying notes 50-57.
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issue, without sufficient justification for doing so.411 However, the

presence or lack ofthe treaty-makers' constitutional authority to control the
domestic legal effect of a treaty
has not yet been presented to the U.S.
12
decision.
for
Court
Supreme
3. The Scope of the Treaty Power
' 413
Article II permits the Senate and the President to make "treaties.
There is an argument that nonself-execution declarations concern only the
domestic implementation of the treaty, and thus are not part of the
international agreement itself.4 4 The Senate has no constitutional power
unicamerally to adopt domestic law merely because it purports to act under
the treaty power.415 Thus, nonself-execution declarations, which
411. Id.at 531 ("The non-self-executing declaration seems to be a vote of no-confidence in
the courts which would otherwise have authority to apply the treaty, yet there is no reason to think
that courts would discharge this function less responsibly than any other branch."); Weissbrodt,
supranote 48, at 67; supratext accompanying notes 403-05.
Because much of the language in the [human rights treaties] denotes selfexecution, and because self-execution provides an effective means of enforcement,
it is improper for the United States to assert a declaration that categorically denies
that effect. Just as United States courts have examined each article of the United
Nations Charter separately to determine its self-executing effect,[FN] so too
should the courts be allowed to consider each [article of the other human rights
treaties].
Weissbrodt, supra note 48, at 70-71 (citing Aquilar v. Standard Oil Co., 318 U.S. 724, 738 (1943);
Saipan v. Dep't of Interior, 502 F.2d 90, 97 (9th Cir. 1974); United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d
267 (2d Cir. 1974); Callas v. United States, 253 F.2d 838, 843 (2d Cir. 1958); Keeney v. United
States, 218 F.2d 843, 844-45 (D.C. Cir. 1954); United States v. Fitzpatrick, 214 F. Supp. 425, 431
(S.D.N.Y. 1963)); see Damrosch, supranote 48, at 518 ("there is no good reason for the Senate to
prevent U.S. courts from contributing to the evolution of international practice").
412. Damrosch, supranote 48, at 527.
413. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
414. Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 32, at 449 (citing Malvina Halberstam, United States
Ratificationof the Convention on the EliminationofAll Forms ofDiscriminationAgainst Women,
31 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 49, 68-70 (1997); John Quigley, The InternationalCovenant
on Civil and PoliticalRights and the Supremacy Clause, 42 DEPAUL L. REv. 1287, 1303-05
(1993); Riesenfeld & Abbott, supra note 30, at 590-600; Charles H. Dearborn, III, Note, The
Domestic Legal Effect of DeclarationsThat Treaty ProvisionsAre Not Self-Executing, 57 TEx. L.
REv. 233, 239-44 (1979)).
415. See Riesenfeld & Abbott, supranote 30, at 589-601.
The basic notion that a treaty is an international instrument governed by
international law leads us inexorably to the conclusion that a reservation which is
not valid under international law has no independent validity in United States law
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undisputably deal only with domestic affairs and have no effect on
4 16 may be beyond the scope of the constitutional
international 4obligations,
17
treaty power.
E. PolicyArguments Against Nonseif-Execution Declarations:The
InternationalImplications
Regardless of whether the constitutional arguments against nonselfexecution declarations pass muster, the practice of attaching them to
human rights treaties is an integral part of the blatantly protectionist U.S.
foreign policy on human rights.4"' Routinely using nonself-execution
declarations communicates to other nations that the United States does not
take its international human rights obligations seriously enough to allow
them to take effect as domestic law.41 9 It also undermines the foreign policy
justifications for ratifying human rights treaties in the first place - most
fundamentally, the motivation to serve as an example to other nations.42°
Nonself-execution declarations render the human rights treaties to
which they are attached empty promises, because the terms ofthose treaties
" ' The United States thus
do not effect any change in U.S. domestic law.42
because an invalid reservation is not part of a treaty. The U.S. Senate (acting with
the President who must concur in the act of the Senate by incorporating its
reservation in an instrument of ratification) does not have a constitutionally
mandated power to unicamerally adopt rules applicable to the United States or its
citizens merely because the Senate purports to act under the treaty power. It is, in
our view, a constitutional requirement that Senate reservations (assented to by the
President in the ratification process) be a valid part of a treaty instrument under
international law in order to have domestic legal effect.
Id. at 589-90. On the question of whether nonself-execution declarations are a proper part of a
treaty under international law, see generally id. at 590-601.
416. See supra text accompanying notes 191-93.
417. See Riesenfeld &Abbott, supranote 30, at 594, 596. But see Bradley& Goldsmith, supra
note 32, at 449-51 (refuting this argument on the basis that nothing inherent in the treaty power
precludes control over the domestic scope of treaties).
418. See infra text accompanying notes 418-45.
419. See, e.g., Henkin, supra note 104, at 348 ("That, for the present at least, the non-selfexecuting declaration is almost exclusively a concomitant of U.S. adherence to human rights
conventions will appear to critics as an additional indication that the United States does not take
such conventions seriously as international obligations.").
420. See supra text accompanying notes 143-49; infra text accompanying notes 421-31.
421. See Henkin, supra note 104, at 344; Weston, U.S. Ratification of the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: With or Without Qualifications, in U.S.
RATIFICATION OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES: WITH OR WITHOUT RESERVATIONS?, supra note
86, at 37; supra text accompanying notes 191-93 & 336-43.
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is seen by other nations as seeking the benefits of human rights treaties most importantly, membership in the organizations that oversee them without assuming any of the burdens 22 The practice of using nonselfexecution declarations reflects an attitude that human rights treaties are
only for other nations, not for the United States. 23
The U.S. foreign policy on human rights promotes a double standard,
whereby the United States seeks to enforce international human rights law
against other nations but is unwilling to have its own practices subjected
to international regulation and scrutiny. 24 On one hand, the United States
More than any other qualifying statement, [the non-self-execution declaration], in
my view, does the most harm. In effect, it emasculates the covenant (the more so
when it is seen in conjunction with the non-immediate-implementation
understanding mentioned earlier). Contrary to the language of the covenant that
conveys a clear self-executing intent, in particular as regards the obligation to take
steps toward the progressive realization of the rights enumerated, the proposed
declaration would require intermediate legislative action to implement the
covenant's provisions, and, accordingly, the covenant would have little or no
effect beyond that of a lofty policy pronouncement. No one could sue in court to
enforce its provisions; no one could use the covenant as a source of genuinely
binding law.... By attempting to remove the issue of the self-executing nature of
the covenant from the courts, where traditionally this issue ultimately has resided,
President Carter may have given away too much too soon and thereby have dealt
a severe blow to the human rights movement with which he has become so closely
identified.
Weston, US. Ratificationofthe InternationalCovenant on Economic, SocialandCulturalRights:
With or Without Qualifications,in U.S. RATIFICATION OF THE HuMAN RIGHTS TREATIES: WITH OR
WITHOUT RESERVATIONS?, supra note 86, at 37-3 8 (discussing the nonself-execution declaration
to the ICESCR).
422. Henkin, supra note 104, at 344.
423. Id.
424. CARTER ET AL., supra note 30, at 799; see Baylis, supra note 198, at 307 ("The U.S.
Senate [does] not seem to understand that [human rights treaties are] intended to call upon each
ratifying country to re-examine its own human rights standards. Instead, it focused on the
opportunity the ratification presented to castigate other countries for their human rights abuses.");
Buergenthal, supra note 43, at 162 ("[I]t smacks of hypocrisy for the U.S. to adopt domestic
legislation designed to ensure the enforcement by other nations of internationally recognized human
rights when it is not prepared to adhere to the very international agreements it purports to enforce
by that legislation"); Fain, supranote 16, at 607 ("The traditional U.S. response to criticism of its
domestic human rights practices is increasingly illegitimate. While acknowledging issues which
merit continuing concern, the United States is generally proud of its human rights record."); id.
at
611 ("While the United States willingly leads international crusades on behalf of human rights, it
remains hypersensitive to external review of its own domestic practices."); Harfeld, supranote 198,
at 59-64; Henkin, supra note 104, at 341 ("U.S. ratification has been described as specious,
meretricious, hypocritical."); id.at 344 ("The United States, it is said, seeks to sit in judgment on
others but will not submit its human rights behavior to international judgment."); Andrew
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played a leading role in establishing the United Nations and drafting the
UDHR and other human rights treaties.425 It also frequently expresses
concern about human rights violations around the world and sometimes
uses economic or military pressure to induce nations to improve their
human rights practices.426 Moreover, U.S. domestic law reflects a
fundamental commitment to domestic human rights protection.427
On the other hand, the United States has an uneasy relationship with
human rights treaties and institutions. 42 ' The United States only
occasionally ratifies human rights treaties, 429 and when it does, it attaches
nonself-execution declarations without fail.430 Furthermore, after declaring
the treaties nonself-executing, it enacts the necessary implementing
legislation erratically, if at all.43'
The root of this double standard lies in U.S. unilateralism,
exceptionalism, and isolationism. 432 At the heart of those beliefs are two

Moravcsik, Why is US. Human Rights Policy so Unilateralist?,in MULTILATERALISM & U.S.
FOREIGN POUCY: AMBIVALENT ENGAGEMENT 345 (Stewart Patrick & Shepard Forman eds., 2002);
van der Vyver, supranote 48, at 777; id.at 827 ("The United States, while refusing to submit itself
to the dictates of international law, is nevertheless quick to judge and to take action against
others."); Fox, supra note 49, at 311-12 ("By using a non-self-execution declaration, the United
States can control the authority given to international enforcement organizations.... But by at least
ratifying the treaties, the United States purports to send the general message of support for human
rights .... ").
[T]he structural conditions under which U.S. human rights policy is made have
blocked full adherence to multilateral norms. No other nation is characterized by
the same combination of geopolitical power, democratic stability, conservative
ideology, and institutional decentralization. The result is an ambivalent policy: the
United States maintains unilateral options for promoting global human rights, but
remains less committed to membership in multilateral human rights institutions
than any other advanced industrial democracy.
Moravcsik, supra,at 359-60.
425. CARTER ET AL.,supra note 30, at 798; see Fain, supranote 16, at 608; Harfeld, supranote
198, at 60-62; supra text accompanying note 70.
426. CARTER ET AL., supra note 30, at 798-99.
427. Id. at 799.
428. Id.; see infra text accompanying notes 430-31.
429. See Fain, supra note 16, at 608-11; Moravcsik, supra note 424, at 345; van der Vyver,
supra note 48, at 778; see generally Harfeld, supra note 198, at 62.
430. See Fain, supra note 16, at 608-11; Harfeld, supranote 198, at 59-64; Moravcsik, supra
note 424, at 345; supra text accompanying notes 246, 284, 293, & 309.
431. See supra text accompanying notes 249, 285, & 310.
432. See, e.g., HENKIN, supranote 70, at 76-77; Louis Henkin, ConstitutionalismandHuman
Rights, in CONST1TUTIONALISM AND RIGHTS: THE INFLUENCE OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
ABROAD 383-95 (Louis Henkin & Albert J. Rosenthal eds., 1990) [hereinafter Henkin,
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related ideas: first, that human rights in the United States are "alive and
well" and do not need scrutiny from other nations whose human rights
protections are much less SO;4 33 and second, that the U.S. government,
especially U.S. courts, would take human rights obligations much more
seriously than would other governments. There are four basic foundations
of this "pervasive sense of cultural relativism, ethnocentrism, and
nationalism"434 in the United States: the U.S. superpower status in world
affairs,4 35 the exceptional stability of democratic governance inside its
borders,4 36 the "general

conservatism" of its politics, 4 37 and the

decentralized and divided nature of its political institutions.4 38 Nonselfexecution declarations reflect this nationalistic sense of superiority and
communicate a "refusal to consider the possibility that change may
potentially bring improvement rather than deterioration" to domestic
human rights protections.439
To a somewhat lesser extent, the foundation of the human rights double
standard also lies in the differences between U.S. constitutional rights and
international human rights." First, American constitutional rights focus
Constitutionalismand Human Rights]; Louis Henkin, InternationalHuman Rights and Rights in
the United States, in HUMAN RIGHTS ININTERNATIONAL LAW: LEGAL AND POLICY ISSUES, supra
note 225, at 25-55; Moravcsik, supra note 424, at 345-71.
433. See Fain, supra note 16, at 607 ("While acknowledging issues which merit continuing
concern, the United States is generally proud of its human rights record. The U.S. justification for
refusing to adopt international human rights law rests on the belief that U.S. law provides adequate
human rights protection."); see Henkin, ConstitutionalismandHuman Rights, supranote 432, at
392; Henkin, InternationalHuman Rights andRights in the United States, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW: LEGAL AND POLICY ISSUES, supra note 225, at 52.
There is resistance to imposing national standards on matters that have long been
deemed 'local'; even more, there is resistance to accepting international standards
and international scrutiny on matters that have been for Americans to decide. A
deep isolationism continues to motivate many Americans, even some who are
eager to judge others and to intercede on behalf of human rights in other countries.
Human rights in the United States, they believe, are alive and well. The United
States has nothing to learn, and does not need scrutiny from others, surely not
from the many countries where human rights fare so badly.
Id. at 52.
434. Moravcsik, supra note 424, at 346.
435. See id.
at 348-50.
436. See id.
at 350-52.
437. See id. at 352-57.
438. See id.
at 358-59.
439. KAUFMAN, supra note 73, at 172.
440. See generallyHENKIN, supranote 70, at 76-77; Henkin, Constitutionalismand Human
Rights, supra note 432, at 393; Henkin, InternationalHuman Rights and Rights in the United
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on the democratic form of government more specifically than do
international rights."' Second, American constitutional rights are natural
rights, and refer back to ideas that are European - rather than universal in nature. 442
Other nations are becoming increasingly frustrated with U.S. foreign
policy on human rights and with U.S. domestic human rights practices. 443
This widespread criticism damages the U.S. credibility in foreign human
rights policy.'" It also undercuts the U.S. foreign policy motivations for
ratifying human rights treaties in the first place, especially the desire to
serve as an example to other nations. 445
States, in HUMAN RIGHTS ININTERNATIONAL LAW: LEGAL AND POLICY ISSUES, supranote 225, at

25-55; supra text accompanying notes 92-95.
441. See Henkin, InternationalHuman Rights and Rights in the United States, in HUMAN
RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: LEGAL AND POLICY ISSUES, supra note 225,.at 51-52.

[R]esistance to United States adherence [to human rights treaties] remains strong.
In some measure, that resistance builds on the differences between constitutional
rights and international human rights.... Contemporary international human
rights, while espousing popular sovereignty, do not imply any particular system
of government; individual participation in government is recognized but is only
one right among others, and the form ofparticipation is not defined.... American
constitutional rights, on the other hand, are individualistic and deeply democratic
in their eighteenth-century conception. Self-government is the basic right on
which all others depend .... Many Americans believe that societies that are not
democratic violate the basic human right on which all others depend; they are
reluctant to adhere to an agreement which reflects a conception of human rights
that does not include that commitment to authentic political democracy.
Id.
442. Henkin, Constitutionalismand Human Rights, supra note 432, at 393.
443. See, e.g., Fain, supra note 16, at 611-12.
444. See, e.g., id; supra text accompanying notes 119-24.
445. See, e.g., Fain, supranote 16, at 611-12; van der Vyver, supranote 48, at 789-90; supra
text accompanying notes 143-49.
[T]he RUDs insisted upon by the Senate as conditions for ratification of human
rights treaties "threaten[] to undermine the credibility of U.S. participation in the
international legal process."..
The United States has been the target of international criticism not so much for
its own violations as for its unwillingness to use its position in the world to set a
good example for others. The United States has a role to play as a member of the
vanguard of nations trying to advocate human rights not only in theory, but in
practice. It should assume this role and work for the improvement of rights in the
world community rather than grudgingly ratifying treaties, while at the same time
concealing their goals within layer upon layer of qualifications.
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VI. CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTIONS FOR THE FUTURE

The U.S. policy on human rights treaties threatens to undermine over
fifty years of effort to establish international human rights standards as
international law." 6 It is essential that the United States regain and
maintain its position as a leader in international human rights and an
example for other nations. But that cannot happen until the United States
starts taking seriously its international obligations under human rights
treaties. Demonstrating respect for international human rights law - and
the instruments and organizations that create it - requires that the United
States stop using nonself-execution declarations," 7 mitigate the effects of

van der Vyver, supranote 48, at 789-90 (quoting M. Christian Green, The "Matrioshka"Strategy:
U.S. Evasion of the Spirit of the InternationalCovenant on Civil and PoliticalRights, 10 S. AFR.
J. HuM. RTS. 357, 370-71 (1994); Stefan A. Riesenfeld & Frederick M. Abbott, Foreword:
Symposium on ParliamentaryParticipationin the Making and Operation of Treaties, 67 CHi.KENT L. REV. 293, 293 (1991)).
Our human-rights responsibilities cannot be discharged by dictating to others
what standards they must comply with, or by shielding our own culture and society
from the influence and dictates of more progressive nations. Concomitantly, this
leadership role cannot be fully realized by placing all energy on domestic
compliance with international norms while turning a blind eye to the human-rights
crises around the world. The two undertakings must be carried out
simultaneously....
The failure of the U.S. to participate in the shared framework of the international
human rights system weakens our credibility as a legitimate force in the movement
as a whole.
Harfeld, supra note 198, at 99-100.
446. Henkin, supra note 104, at 349.
U.S. ratification practice threatens to undermine a half-century of effort to
establish international human rights standards as international law. Lawyers (and
others) committed to the international human rights movement should be on guard
to ensure that U.S. ratification policy not set an unfortunate example to other states
contemplating adherence, that it not encourage states that have ratified to take their
obligations under the conventions lightly. Lawyers in the United States should
take arms against the anticonstitutional practice of declaring human rights
conventions non-self-executing.
Id.
447. See, e.g., id. at 350 (urging "that the United States "abandon its practice of declaring
human rights conventions non-self-executing").
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nonself-execution declarations already made," 8 ratify more of the major
human rights treaties," 9 and start complying with its treaty obligations. But
ratification alone does nothing to advance the nation's standing in the
global arena unless the United States is prepared to take on real obligations
under those treaties.45 °
448. See, e.g., id. ("If a human rights convention has been declared non-self-executing, the
United States should enact early legislation to implement the convention.").
449. See generally Buergenthal, supra note 43, at 162; Damrosch, supra note 48, at 532;
Harfeld, supranote 198, at 99-100; Henkin, InternationalHuman Rights andRights in the United
States, in HUMAN RIGHTS ININTERNATIONAL LAW: LEGAL AND POuCY ISSUES, supra note 225, at
50-55.
By not adhering to these treaties, the U.S. has intentionally excluded itself from
probably the most important international movement of our time, a movement that
gives expression to mankind's ever more urgent demand for a more human world.
It weakens that movement and is shamefully arrogant for a great democracy to
proclaim to the rest of the world that it has nothing to gain from or contribute to
the system these treaties establish. Neither can it be denied that it smacks of
hypocrisy for the U.S. to adopt domestic legislation designed to ensure the
enforcement by other nations of internationally recognized human rights when it
is not prepared to adhere to the very international agreements it purports to enforce
by that legislation. Moreover, the U.S. sets a very bad precedent with the
numerous reservations and declarations it seeks to attach to these instruments upon
adhering to them. It is one thing to make a reservation that is constitutionally
mandated, it is quite another to do so in order to ensure that the treaty would be
devoid of domestic legal force, which is the practical effect of the [nonselfexecution declaration].
Buergenthal, supranote 43, at 162.
Our human-rights responsibilities cannot be discharged by dictating to others
what standards they must comply with, or by shielding our own culture and society
from the influence and dictates of more progressive nations. Concomitantly, this
leadership role cannot be fully realized by placing all energy on domestic
compliance with international norms while turning a blind eye to the human-rights
crises around the world. The two undertakings must be carried out simultaneously,
with genuine respect and humility....
The failure of the U.S. to participate in the shared framework of the international
human rights system weakens our credibility as a legitimate force in the movement
as a whole.
Harfeld, supra note 198, at 99-100; on mitigating the effects of nonself-execution declarations
already made, see Damrosch, supra note 48, at 532; Sloss, The Domestication of International
Human Rights, supranote 49, at 220.
450. See Harfeld, supra note 198, at 59-60.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol17/iss1/8

70

Friedman: The Uneasy U.S. Relationship with Human Rights Treaties: The Cons

2005] THE UNEASY US. RELATIONSHIP WITH HUMAN RIGHTS TREA TIES: THE CONSTITUTIONAL TREATY

257

Ratification of multilateral human rights treaties is important for many
reasons.451 But if and when the treaty-makers ratify future human rights
treaties, "they should either agree on implementing legislation to fulfill the
requirements of the treaty or agree that the treaty will be self-executing. 452
If neither of those options is feasible, it would be wiser to refrain entirely
from ratification than to ratify the treaties with nonself-execution
declarations.453 Not only are there significant constitutional arguments
against the declarations,4 54 but their use shows more disrespect than does
non-ratification for international human rights efforts and for other nations.
The United States must stop perpetuating the double standard of
international human rights.455 The United States seeks to gain access to the
Relative to its size and power, the United States is presently one of the most
insolent delinquents in the international human rights community. Despite this, we
continue to preach to and chastise other nations around the world for their human
rights shortcomings. If we aim to sustain our credibility and to encourage a greater
respect for and compliance with international human rights standards around the
world, we must begin to practice as we preach.
Id.
451. See supra text accompanying notes 143-49; see also Henkin, Constitutionalismand
Human Rights, supra note 432, at 395; Henkin, InternationalHuman Rights and Rights in the
UnitedStates, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: LEGAL AND POLICY ISSUES, supra note
225, at 50-51.
We have reasons to celebrate the U.S. Constitution, particularly because it is the
bulwark of our rights, and to be proud of the jurisprudence of rights that we have
developed and of its influence in bringing the idea to all parts of the world. Others
have taken our ideas and defined, refined, enlarged, and supplemented them. We
should be proud of our role in that process as well. We need not resist these
refinements as alien ideas; rather, we might welcome them as our own, writ larger.
To me that suggests that we should quickly adhere to international instruments and
help to develop them in the spirit of our own ideas, from which they derive. We
should look to international instruments to update our own idea of rights and
enhance and enlarge the blessings they have brought us.
Henkin, Constitutionalismand Human Rights, supra note 432, at 395.
452. Sloss, The Domestication of InternationalHuman Rights, supra note 49, at 221.
453. See generallyvan der Vyver, supra note 48, at 832-33 ("The United States can serve the
international community better by, and will derive considerable benefits from, being part of the
team which seeks to uphold universal respect for and observance of human rights .. .and
demonstrat[ing] a willingness to submit itself to the norms that it so anxiously seeks to impose on
others ....).
454. See supra text accompanying notes 374-417.
455. See Harfeld, supra note 198, at 64.
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institutions of international human rights law and to influence other nations
and to impose obligations on them, but refuses to accept any obligations
to effect changes in its own law.45 6 The United States should either commit
to the terms of human rights treaties or refrain from ratifying them at all.
The treaty-makers should not ratify any more human rights treaties until
they are prepared to make real, concrete, and unqualified commitments to
the terms of those treaties.

It is time for the U.S. to acknowledge and correct this double standard. This may
be accomplished three ways: 1) through the use of domestic law, legislation, and
jurisprudence; 2) by promoting agitation and activism in U.S. civil society and
international activism and press coverage; and 3) by utilizing the abilities of
international adjudicative bodies to press for U.S. compliance with human-rights
norms. Ultimately, abandoning our self-righteous attitude will further our ability
to promote and model rather than erode human rights in the international
community.
Id.
456. See supra text accompanying notes 143-49, 191-93, 335-42,418-23, & 428-31.
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